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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays that focus on China’s interbank money 
market. The first essay is an empirical examination of the responses of China’s short-term 
interbank interest rates to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)’s policy instruments, and 
how these responses were affected by structural changes. The results indicate that the 
interbank interest rates responded to policy instruments differently following three 
structural changes related to the 2007-08 global financial crisis and major operational 
changes by the PBOC in 2011 and 2013. The results also suggest that there were 
significant discrepancies between the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) and the 
interbank repo rate’s responses to policy instruments.  
The second essay is an empirical assessment of the transmission of liquidity shocks 
between China’s interbank money market that supplies liquidity to the banking sector and 
China’s exchange-based money market that supplies liquidity to the stock market, based 
on the co-movements of interest rate spreads in these two markets. The segmentation 
between the two money markets was supposed to prevent the transmission of liquidity 
shocks between China’s banking sector and stock market during liquidity-related market 
events. However, the results in this study suggest that the trading and financing activities 
in the two money markets allowed liquidity shocks to circumvent the market segmentation 
during two recent market events, including the rollercoaster ride of China’s stock market 
in 2014-15 and the cash crunch in China’s banking sector in mid-2013.  
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The third essay is an attempt to infer how China’s monetary policymakers may 
have handled the famous monetary policy trilemma based on an empirical exploration of 
the interactions between the onshore and offshore renminbi interbank interest rates. The 
results suggest that, during most of the last three to four years, the monetary policymaking 
of the PBOC has been bounded by the trilemma like the central banks in the other major 
economies, with the exception of a 15-month period since May 2014. The results also 
suggest that the PBOC may have switched their priorities among the three components of 
the trilemma several times in recent years in responses to different market environments. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The interbank money market refers to the component of a country’s financial 
system mainly reserved for banks and other financial institutions to lend and borrow short-
term funds, as well as buy and sell short-term credit instruments with maturities typically 
of one year or less among each other. The interbank money market serves several crucial 
functions in a modern financial system. First, it enables the banks with liquidity shortage 
to borrow funds from the banks with liquidity surplus in order to meet their obligations 
and reserve requirements. Meanwhile, the transactions in the interbank money market 
determine the interbank interest rates that are typically used as benchmarks to price all 
other debts. Furthermore, the interbank money market provides a medium for the central 
bank to target and intervene the market interest rates. Additionally, the interbank money 
market has increasingly become a major funding source for long-term debts, as securitized 
banking takes over the traditional form of banking.  
The gradual liberalization of China’s financial system since the 1990s has brought 
about a booming interbank money market in China. Although the liberalization is still a 
work-in-progress, the interbank money market in China has already occupied a key 
position in China’s financial system after two decades of rapid development and expansion. 
The interbank money market now determines the benchmark interest rates being used for 
all bond issuances in China, after the interest rates of bonds were liberalized from 
government controls. The interbank money market also allows the investors in China’s 
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stock market to be indirectly financed by funds from the banking sector, after the non-
bank financial institutions with presence in China’s stock market were granted access to 
the interbank money market. In addition, the interbank money market provides a gateway 
for foreign intuitional investors to invest their offshore renminbi holdings back to the 
onshore market as well as to obtain renminbi financing from the onshore market, after the 
interbank money market became the first market to be opened up to foreign investors. 
 The evolving interbank money market in China raises concerns on the following 
three important policy questions.  
1. As the benchmark interest rates in China transition from being specified by the 
government to being determined by the interbank money market, is the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, still able to effectively manage the 
market interest rates with its existing policy instruments?  
2. Does the expanding interbank money market in China makes it more likely for 
liquidity shocks to transmit between China’s closely guarded banking sector and 
China’s volatile stock market, despite the prohibition for banks to directly access 
the stock market?  
3. Does the increasing interconnectivity between the onshore and offshore renminbi 
money markets affect the effectiveness of the PBOC’s capital controls and its 
handling of the famous monetary policy trilemma?  
In this dissertation, I address the three policy questions above with three separated essays 
contained in Chapters II, III and IV, respectively. In Chapter II, I empirically examine the 
responses of China’s short-term interbank interest rates to the PBOC’s policy instruments, 
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as well as how these responses were affected by structural changes. This study extends the 
previous literature on the interaction between the interbank interest rate and the monetary 
policy instruments in China by incorporating new data and considering the impact of 
structural changes in the interest rate model for the first time. In Chapter III, I empirically 
assess the transmission of liquidity shocks between China’s interbank money market that 
supplies liquidity to the banking sector and China’s exchange-based money market that 
supplies liquidity to the stock market, based on the co-movements of interest rate spreads 
in these two markets. This study is the first empirical assessment of the transmission of 
liquidity shocks though money market transactions in China. In Chapter IV, I infer how 
China’s monetary policymakers may have handled the monetary policy trilemma based 
on an empirical exploration of the interactions between the onshore and offshore renminbi 
interbank interest rates. This study is made possible for the first time by the June 2013 
launch of the previously inexistent benchmark interbank interest rate for the offshore 
renminbi and over three years of data accumulation since its launch. In the end, my 
findings are summarized in Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON THE INTERACTION 
BETWEEN SHORT-TERM INTERBANK INTEREST RATES IN CHINA AND 
THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS OF CHINA’S CENTRAL BANK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A central bank’s ability to implement monetary policies relies crucially on its 
ability to control market interest rates. For major developed economies, the interactions 
between short-term interbank interest rates and the central banks’ open market operations 
(OMOs) enable their central banks to anchor the short end of the yield curve and guide the 
market interest rates. For example, in the U.S., the federal funds rate is targeted by the 
Federal Reserve (the Fed) and maintained at around the target level by its OMOs. In the 
Eurozone, the Eonia and Euribor, two major interbank reference rates, closely track the 
interest rates of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s main refinancing operations (MROs). 
Previous studies generally agree that the Fed and the ECB’s monetary interventions via 
OMOs effectively move the short-term interbank interest rates in their respective markets. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argued that the federal funds rate sensitively recorded shocks 
to the supply of bank reserves, making it a good indicator for monetary policy. Hamilton 
(1996) found overwhelming evidence for liquidity effect in the federal funds market, 
which enabled the Fed to change the interest rate on a daily basis. Bartolini, Bertola and 
Prati (2002) proposed a model of interbank money market volatility with an explicit role 
for central bank intervention and periodic reserve requirements, which was consistent with 
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the empirical patterns of the federal funds rate. Moschitz (2004) revealed that most of the 
predictable patterns in the mean and volatility of the overnight interbank interest rate in 
the Eurozone were related to the ECB’s monetary policy implementation. However, these 
assessments are not necessarily applicable to China’s interbank interest rate and its central 
bank’s monetary interventions. According to Prati, Bartolini and Bertola (2003), many 
key features of the U.S. federal funds rate’s behavior were not robust to different 
institutional details and styles of central bank interventions in other major industrial 
countries.  
 China’s interest rate liberalization is still a work-in-progress. When China 
completes its transition from a government-specified interest rate system to a market-
based system in the future, the short-term interbank interest rate in China will likely take 
on a more central role in market interest rate determination and monetary policy 
implementation, similar to its counterparts in the U.S. and the Eurozone. In this scenario, 
the ability to control the interbank interest rate with OMOs and reserve requirement will 
be critical for the PBOC to effectively conduct monetary policies. However, according to 
previous empirical studies based on pre-2011 data (Porter and Xu, 2009; He and Wang, 
2012), China’s interbank interest rate was mainly responsive to the benchmark interest 
rates for bank deposits and loans administratively set by the PBOC, but not significantly 
responsive or only slightly responsive to the PBOC’s market liquidity interventions via 
OMOs and changes in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Unless the PBOC’s regulatory 
and operational changes after these studies led to structural change(s) in the interbank 
interest rate that strengthened its interactions with the PBOC’s liquidity interventions and 
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weakened its dependence on the PBOC’s non-market-determined policy benchmark rates, 
it would be hard to convince the policy makers to control market interest rates only with 
market based measures without resorting to the policy benchmark rates. Therefore, the 
primary motivation of this paper is to investigate if there exist structural breaks in the 
interbank interest rate series that coincides with the PBOC’s major regulatory operational 
changes since 2011, and to empirically verify if China’s interbank interest rate reacted 
differently to the PBOC’s policy instruments after the structural breaks in a way that favors 
the use of market based interest rate interventions over more traditional administrative 
measures.  
 Besides updating and amending the earlier empirical findings on China’s interbank 
interest rate, we also intend to extend the coverage of previous studies to Shanghai 
Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR), a new interbank reference rate introduced in October 
2006 as China’s equivalent of Libor but yet to be thoroughly studied, possibly due to its 
short history and limited sample size. Unlike the interbank repo rate, the main subject in 
previous studies such as Porter and Xu (2009), SHIBOR is an unsecured rate for credit 
based interbank lending rather than a collateral rate, and is based on quotes rather than 
actual transactions.1 In recent years, although interbank repo rates are still commonly used 
to price floating rate notes (Zhou, Li and Sun, 2013), SHIBOR has become the main 
reference rate for fixed rate corporate bonds and commercial papers (PBOC, 2015a), 
making it an important subject for new studies on China’s interbank interest rate.  
                                                          
1 “About Shibor” on Shibor official website: http://www.shibor.org/shibor/web/html/index_e.html [in Chinese] 
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In this paper, we choose the overnight and 7-day SHIBOR and interbank repo rates 
as the subjects of our analysis, because the overnight and 7-day maturities are the most 
liquid types on both the secured and unsecured interbank markets2. Based on the empirical 
behaviors of these four rates, we specifically address the following research questions: 1. 
Were there one or more structural changes in China’s interbank interest rate? If so, were 
they related to any of the regulatory and operational changes of the PBOC since 2011? 2. 
Was China’s interbank interest rate significantly responsive to PBOC’s main policy 
instruments, namely the policy benchmark rates, OMOs and RRR? How did these 
responses vary across structural changes in terms of significance and magnitude? 3. Are 
the answers to Questions 1 and 2 consistent across the four types of interbank interest rates?   
 
2.2 Background  
Before presenting the detailed analysis and the results, we would like to first 
provide a brief background on the status quo of China’s interest rate system, the theoretical 
basis on how the interbank interest rate may react to the PBOC’s policy instruments under 
the current system, and the PBOC’s recent regulatory and operational changes that might 
have led to structural changes in the empirical behavior of the interbank interest rate. 
 
2.2.1 China’s dual-track interest rate system 
Although China already has a liquid interbank market, the role of interbank interest 
rate as a market benchmark has been largely limited to the money market and the bond 
                                                          
2 Measured by the daily turnover for each maturity in these two markets (Source: CEIC Data) 
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market. The PBOC issues a separated set of benchmark interest rates for bank loans and 
deposits, and confines the actual deposit and loan rates offered by banks with a deposit 
rate ceiling and a lending rate floor set in proportion to the respective benchmark rate. 
Unlike the Fed, the PBOC does not explicitly target a short-term interbank interest rate 
when conducting OMOs. Besides setting the benchmark rates for the banks and routine 
OMOs, the PBOC frequently changes RRR to manage market liquidity, which is unusual 
among major economies (Ma, Yan and Liu, 2011). In addition, the PBOC use window 
guidance, a form of persuasion tactic, to set loan growth target for individual banks, which 
could also impact the market interest rate (Chen, Chen and Gerlach, 2011). However, since 
window guidance is directed to individual banks and is not usually observable, our study 
will focus only on the impact of the PBOC’s benchmark rates, OMOs and RRR.  
 
2.2.2 The PBOC’s policy instruments as the determinants of interbank interest rate 
The theoretical connections between the interbank interest rate and the PBOC’s 
official benchmark rates, RRR and OMOs were established by Porter and Xu (2009) based 
on Freixas and Rochet (2008)’s microeconomic framework of banking. Their model 
assumes a competitive market of N price-taking banks maximizing profits by choosing the 
optimal deposits, loans, bond holdings (assumed to be inelastically supplied by the 
government) and positions on the interbank market in each period subjected to reserve 
requirement and their own liquidity preferences. The competitive equilibrium is 
characterized by the clearing conditions of loan market, savings market and interbank 
market. At equilibrium, interbank interest rate is a function of deposit and loan interest 
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rates (which are assumed to follow the PBOC benchmark rates), RRR (which is set by the 
PBOC), and the issuance of government bonds (which can be considered a form of OMO). 
Chen, Chen and Gerlach (2011) and He and Wang (2012) further modified Porter and Xu 
(2009)’s model to account for the impact of window guidance and money flows between 
banking sector and the bond market, respectively. The predictions of these models varied 
with model types and assumptions. For example, assuming the deposit rate ceiling was 
binding as commonly believed, Porter and Xu (2009) and Chen, Chen and Gerlach (2011) 
predicted negative impact of deposit benchmark rate on the interbank interest rate, but He 
and Wang (2012) predicted otherwise. For RRR to have positive impact on the interbank 
interest rate, Porter and Xu (2009)’s model required sufficient liquidity preferences of the 
banks and Chen, Chen and Gerlach (2011)’s model required a loan target level for banks 
set by the PBOC.  
 
2.2.3 Policy factors that could lead to structural changes 
The major regulatory and operational changes on the three major policy 
instruments since 2008 are listed in Table 2.1. As the restrictions on the bank interest rates 
were gradually loosened by the PBOCs, the actual rates offered by the banks may have 
been able to move closer to the competitive equilibrium without hitting the deposit rate 
ceiling or lending rate floor, making the restrictions non-binding. Meanwhile, the variable 
reserve requirement may force banks to have a higher liquidity preference, thereby making 
the impact of RRR on the interbank interest rate more positive, based on Porter and Xu 
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(2009)’s assessment. In addition, the creation of new OMO tools might finally make 
OMOs a significant determinant of the interbank interest rate.  
 
Restrictions on deposit and 
loan interest rates 
Reserve requirement Open market operations 
The PBOC lowered the lending 
rate floor for banks on 
 Jul-2012: from 0.9x lending 
benchmark rate to 0.7x 
 Jul-2013: lending rate floor 
removed 
 
The PBOC started enforcing 
two RRRs since Sep-2008 
 Small and medium sized 
financial institutions to 
have a lower RRR than 
large national banks 
Between 2004 and 2013, the 
PBOC conducted OMOs with 
 Central bank bills (CB) with 
3-month to 3-year maturities 
 Repos and reversed repos with 
7-day to 6-month maturities 
The PBOC raised the deposit 
rate ceiling for banks on 
 Jun-2012: from 1.0x deposit 
benchmark rate to 1.1x 
 Nov-2014: from 1.1x to 1.2x 
 Mar-2015: from 1.2x to 1.3x 
The PBOC adopted a variable 
reserve requirement scheme in 
the beginning of 2011 
 The RRR for a specific 
financial institution 
depends on a set of 
financial health metrics 
specified by the PBOC on 
top of the standard RRR 
Since the Short-term Liquidity 
Operations (SLO) was introduced 
in 2013, the PBOC conducted 
OMOs with 
 CBs 
 Repos and reversed repos 
 SLOs with 1-day to 6-day 
maturities 
 
Table 2.1. Regulatory and operational changes on the PBOC’s instruments. (Source: PBOC 2009, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015b, 2015c, CEIC) 
  
 
2.3 Empirical Analysis 
2.3.1 The data  
2.3.1.1 Interbank interest rate 
The overnight and 7-day SHIBOR and interbank repo rates data were collected 
from the National Interbank Funding Center (NIBFC) (Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1. Interbank interest rate series (Source: NIBFC) 
 
The repo fixing rates used in this study were published daily based on the medium rates 
for all transactions between 9am-11am on each trading day for each repo type, respectively. 
In comparison, the daily SHIBOR quotes for different maturities are calculated by 
averaging all the rate quotes (excluding the highest and lowest two) offered by a 
preselected group of banks with high credit ratings. The SHIBOR quotation group consists 
of 18 major domestic and foreign commercial banks operating in China, which are either 
primary dealers of the PBOC’s OMOs or market makers in the FX market3. The four 
interbank rate series are modeled separately for the period between October 9, 2006 (when 
SHIBOR was introduced) and May 29, 2015 (when the database was last accessed by the 
authors). Although the repo rate and SHIBOR with the same maturity generally move 
closely together, many factors could lead to non-trivial differences between their 
movements. For example, the access to the unsecured interbank lending market is more 
restrictive than the interbank repo market, making some of the participants in the repo 
market unable to trade in the unsecured market (Cassola and Porter, 2013). 
                                                          
3 “About Shibor” on Shibor official website: http://www.shibor.org/shibor/web/html/index_e.html [in Chinese] 
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2.3.1.2 The PBOC’s monetary instruments 
The variable representing the PBOC benchmark rates in our study is the 3-month 
deposit benchmark rate collected from the PBOC’s website4, which has the shortest term 
among the PBOC’s fixed-term deposit benchmark rates. In our empirical models, only the 
deposit benchmark rate is included but not the loan benchmark rate. Such arrangement is 
to avoid a potential multicollinearity problem for the interest rate models, due to the fact 
that the PBOC almost always changed the deposit and loan benchmark rate simultaneously.  
However, this situation also makes it difficult to interpret the impact of the deposit 
benchmark rate in the models, because any movements in the interbank market associated 
with changes in the deposit benchmark rate could actually be the combined impact from 
both the deposit and loan benchmark rates. The current and historical RRRs are also 
obtained from the PBOC’s website5 . There have been two different RRRs since the 
PBOC’s start enforcing the 2-tier reserve requirement in 2008, but only the RRR for the 
large financial institutions is used in this study to avoid multicollinearity. The PBOC’s 
open market operations data are collected from CEIC’s China Premium Database6. The 
final OMO variable used in this study is measured by daily net liquidity drain by the PBOC, 
calculated as the sum of the PBOC’s CB and repo (including SLO) issuance of all 
maturities, plus the total expiring reversed repo (including SLO), minus the total expiring 
CB and repo, and minus the total reversed repo issuance for each trading day. The three 
PBOC-controlled variables are visualized in Figure 2.2.  
                                                          
4 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125440/125838/125888/2968982/index.html [in Chinese] 
5 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125434/125798/17085/index1.html [in Chinese] 
6 http://www.ceicdata.com/en/countries/china  
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Figure 2.2. Selective monetary instruments (Source: PBOC, CEIC) 
 
 
2.3.1.3 Other exogenous variables 
The short time horizon of the interest rate data and the added dimensions 
associated with structural changes limit the number of variables that can be reliably 
estimated. The only additional variable besides the interest rate and policy variables in our 
model is a dummy variable for the trading days before the Chinese New Year in each year. 
The enormous cash need during this traditional festival is believed to have caused major 
liquidity drains from the banking system in the business days immediately before the 
official holidays. Such phenomenon has been acknowledged by the PBOC, which usually 
pledged sufficient liquidity supply to the banking system before the holidays (PBOC, 2010; 
2015a). 
 
2.3.2 The empirical model for interbank interest rate 
This paper follows the tradition of Hamilton (1996), Bartolini, Bertola and Prati 
(2002), Prati, Bartolini and Bertola (2003), Moschitz (2004) and Porter and Xu (2009) to 
-500
-300
-100
100
300
500
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Billion CNY%
3m deposit benchmark rate RRR for large banks OMO (right axis)
14 
 
model the conditional mean of the interbank interest rate as an autoregressive process and 
its conditional variance as an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) process introduced by 
Nelson (1991). Using EGARCH instead of standard GARCH allows asymmetric volatility 
responses to the positive and negative changes of the interbank rate. The variables 
representing the PBOC’s policy instruments enter the mean and variance equations as 
exogenous variables. The AR(p)-EGARCH(m,s) system is specified as 
Mean equation: 
 𝑟𝑡 =  𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                (2.1) 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜙0 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑟𝑑,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦𝑡         (2.2) 
Variance equation:  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑣𝑡√ℎ𝑡              (2.3) 
ln(ℎ𝑡) = 𝜔𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
|𝜀𝑡−𝑘|+𝛾𝑘𝜀𝑡−𝑘
√ℎ𝑡−𝑘
𝑚
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln(ℎ𝑡−𝑛)
𝑠
𝑛=1         (2.4) 
𝜔𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝑐1Δ𝑟𝑑,𝑡
+ + 𝑐2Δ𝑟𝑑,𝑡
− + 𝑐3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿,𝑡 + 𝑐4𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 + 𝑐5𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦𝑡       (2.5) 
In the mean equation, 𝑟𝑡 is the selected interbank interest rate and 𝜇𝑡 is the conditional 
expectation 𝐸(𝑟𝑡|𝑟𝑡−1, … , 𝑟𝑡−𝑝, 𝑟𝑑,𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿,𝑡, 𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦𝑡) , where 𝑟𝑑,𝑡  is the 3-month 
deposit benchmark rate at time t, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿,𝑡 is the RRR for large banks at time t, 𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 is the 
net liquidity drain by the PBOC at time t and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦𝑡 is the dummy variable for the last 
five trading days before the Chinese New Year. In the variance equation, ℎ𝑡  is the 
conditional variance of the innovations 𝜀𝑡, given that 𝑣𝑡 is an iid random variable with 
zero mean and unit variance. Δ𝑟𝑑,𝑡
+  is the change of 3-month deposit benchmark rate at 
time t if the change is positive, while Δ𝑟𝑑,𝑡
−  is the change of 3-month deposit benchmark 
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rate at time t if the change is negative. Separating rate hikes and rate drops is to account 
for the scenario that any policy rate change decision could induce market volatility 
regardless of the direction of change. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the magnitude 
of policy rate changes is more relevant to the market volatility than the level of policy 
rates. Equation (2.4) is the standard formulation of an EGARCH(m, s) model except for 
the time varying 𝜔𝑡, which is adjusted for the impact of policy variables and the Chinese 
New Year. A distributional assumption for 𝑣𝑡 is required to fit the AR-EGARCH model 
using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Several previous studies, such as Prati, 
Bartolini and Bertola (2003) and Porter and Xu (2009) used Student-t distribution. But in 
our preliminary analysis on the current data, the innovation distribution seems to have 
more leptokurtosis and fatter tails than a Student-t distribution, which coheres well with 
the generalized error distribution (GED) as originally suggested by Nelson (1991).  
 
2.3.3 The test for structural changes 
The structural change test focuses on the mean equation specified in Section 2.3.2, 
because our main concern is the implication of structural changes on the ability of the 
PBOC’s policy instruments in guiding the level of interbank interest rate. The linear model 
to be tested for structural change is formed by combining Equations (2.1) and (2.2): 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜙0 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑟𝑑,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (2.6) 
We define a (p+5)-dimensional parameter   
𝜽𝑡 = (𝜙0,𝑡, 𝜙1,𝑡, … , 𝜙𝑝,𝑡, 𝑏1,𝑡, 𝑏2,𝑡, 𝑏3,𝑡, 𝑏4,𝑡)                                                                  (2.7) 
and a (p+5)-dimensional observation 
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𝒀𝑡 = (𝑟𝑡, 𝑟𝑡−1, … , 𝑟𝑡−𝑝, 𝑟𝑑,𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿,𝑡, 𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑦𝑡)                                                  (2.8) 
Under the assumption that for each observation 𝒀𝑡 at time t, there is a parameter 
𝜽𝑡  such that the autoregression model specified by Equation (2.6) holds, the null 
hypothesis for no structural changes in the model can be stated as  
𝐻0: 𝜽𝑡 = 𝜽   ∀ 𝑡   where 𝜽 is a constant. 
Testing the null hypothesis requires a method that’s flexible enough for multiple structural 
changes at unspecific times, efficient enough to deal with the multiple dimensions of the 
parameter, compatible with MLE, and also consistent even when heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation is presented in 𝜀𝑡 . The generalized M-fluctuation test introduced by 
Zeileis and Hornik (2003) seems to be an ideal fit for the task. The structural change test 
in this study is performed following the procedures specified by Zeileis (2005, 2006). The 
test is based on a full-sample M-estimator defined as  
∑ 𝜓𝑛𝑡=1 (𝒀𝑡, ?̂?) = 0             (2.9) 
where 𝜓(∙) is an M-estimation score function, in this case a maximum likelihood (ML) 
score function, with zero expectation at the true parameters. Under the null hypothesis, 
𝐸 (𝜓(𝒀𝑡 , ?̂?)) = 0 , any systematic deviation from the null can be captured using a 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) process of the scores: 
𝑊𝑛(𝜏) = 𝑛
−1/2 ∑ 𝜓(𝒀𝑡, ?̂?)
⌊𝑛𝜏⌋
𝑡=1           (2.10) 
in which 𝜏 ∈ [0, 1] is the relative location in the sample period. 𝜏 = 0 represents the start 
date of the sample and 𝜏 = 1 represents the end date of the sample. The decorrelated 
empirical fluctuation process of the model can be written as 
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𝑒𝑓𝑝(𝜏) = ?̂?−1/2𝑊𝑛(𝜏)          (2.11) 
in which  ?̂? is the estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the scores 𝜓. Different 
types of covariance estimators can be used for ?̂?.  Considering the explicit assumption of 
heteroskedasticity in Section 2.3.2 and possible serial correlation in the innovations of the 
AR(p) model, a kernel based heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
estimator for covariance matrix (Andrews, 1991) is used in this study. Based on a 
functional central limit theorem (FCLT), it can be shown that the empirical fluctuation 
process converges to a Brownian bridge. 
𝑒𝑓𝑝(∙)
d
→ 𝑊0(∙)            (2.12) 
Equation (2.12) provides the probabilistic basis for using the empirical M-fluctuation 
process specified by Equation (2.11) to visually inspect the instabilities of parameter 
estimates in Equation (2.6) over time. To enable significance testing for parameter 
instabilities, Zeileis and Hornik (2003) specified a scalar function 𝜆(𝑒𝑓𝑝) to aggregate the 
𝑒𝑓𝑝(∙) into a single test statistic and also provide the methods to obtain the asymptotic 
critical values.  
If the existence of structural changes is confirmed by the test, a dating procedure 
to identify the time of structural breaks is needed for segmenting the data and comparing 
parameter estimates before and after each structural change. For this purpose, the RSS-
based dating technique specified in Bai and Perron (2003), which is insensitive to error 
variance, is performed after the M-fluctuation test. Suppose there are m breakpoints in the 
data, the full-sample residual sum of squares is given by 
𝑅𝑆𝑆(𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑚) = ∑ 𝑟𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑖−1, 𝑡𝑖)
𝑚+1
𝑖=1          (2.13) 
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where (𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑚)  are the breakpoints, 𝑟𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑖−1, 𝑡𝑖)  is the minimal residual sum of 
squares in the segment between 𝑡𝑖−1 and 𝑡𝑖, assuming 𝑡0 = 0 and 𝑡𝑚+1 = 𝑛. According to 
Bai and Perron (2003), a dynamic programming algorithm can be used to optimize 
Equation (2.13) and select optimal break dates (𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑚) for each given m. Then the 
optimal number of breakpoints m can be chosen by Schwarz’s Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) if the maximum of m is specified.  
 
2.3.4 Estimation strategies 
Before the empirical model in Section 2.3.2 is estimated, the structural change 
analysis specified in Section 2.3.3 is performed on each of the four interest rate series to 
verify the existence of structural changes in the mean equation and to determine the 
specific dates of these changes. Based on these dates, the data is partitioned into segments 
before and after structural changes, and the AR-EGARCH model is estimated for each 
interest rate series separately for each segment.  
The structural change analysis starts with unit root tests. If no unit roots are 
detected in the interest rate series, the interest rate levels are then used directly in the AR(p) 
model specified in (6). For each interest rate series, the order of the AR(p) model is chosen 
as a p ∈ [0, 5] that minimize the BIC of the model. Limiting the maximum p to the length 
of a typical trading week is to maintain parsimony of the model used for structural change 
test. After the model is specified, the visualization of parameter instabilities by empirical 
M-fluctuation process as well as the testing and dating of structural changes can be 
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performed on each interest rate series. And then the dates of structural changes can be 
used to partition the data. 
The AR(p)-EGARCH(m, s) model for each rate type in each segment is estimated 
by maximizing a single likelihood function instead of first estimating the AR portion then 
fit the EGARCH portion with AR residuals. The preliminary attempts to fit the AR-
EGARCH models reveal high order serial correlation in the AR residuals which could not 
be eliminated by including more lags in the mean equations. As a remedy to this issue, the 
original AR(p)-EGARCH(m, s) model is extended to an ARMA(p, q)-EGARCH(m, s) 
model. The optimal (p, q, m, s) is determined by fitting the models with all possible (p, q, 
m, s) combinations that satisfy the following restrictions: p, q ∈ (0,1, … , p∗) and  m, s ∈
(1, 2) where p∗ is the order used in the structural break test, and finding the (p, q, m, s) 
combination that results in the lowest BIC.  
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Structural changes and their dates 
The structural change analysis supports the existence of multiple structural 
changes in China’s interbank interest rate and their linkages to the PBOC’s regulatory and 
operational changes on policy instruments. The tests for structural changes are based on 
the level of interest rates, because both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-
Perron test reject unit roots in all the four interbank interest rate series. The models 
selected based on minimum BIC are AR(3) for overnight SHIBOR and overnight repo 
rates, and AR(2) for 7-day SHIBOR and 7-day repo rates, respectively. The empirical M-
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fluctuation process (EMFP) for parameters in each of these four models are calculated 
based on Equation (2.11) and plotted against a 5% asymptotic critical value. Figure 2.3-
2.6 shows the aggregated 𝑒𝑓𝑝(∙) for all parameters in each model.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. EMFP for overnight SHIBOR (Aggregated test statistic = 2.78, p-value = 0.000) 
 
 
Figure 2.4. EMFP for overnight repo rate (Aggregated test statistic = 2.78, p-value = 0.000) 
 
 
Figure 2.5. EMFP for 7-day SHIBOR (Aggregated test statistic = 2.45, p-value = 0.000) 
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Figure 2.6. EMFP for 7-day repo rate (Aggregated test statistic = 2.54, p-value = 0.000) 
 
 
The EMFPs reveal significant parameter instabilities in the models of all the four 
interbank interest rates, because each EMFPs spikes above its 5% critical values multiple 
times over the sample period, which are signals for structural changes. The aggregate M-
fluctuation test statistics for the four interest rate models all reject the hypothesis of no 
structural changes at 5% significance level, further confirming the existence of structural 
changes in these models. If the two spikes between late 2010 and early 2011 in the EMFPs 
of the 7-day rates are considered a single structural change point, then the overnight rates 
and the 7-day rates share the first two structural changes, one between late 2007 and early 
2008 and the other between late 2010 and early 2011. The 7-day rates had another 
structural change at around mid-2013, which is not captured by the EMFPs of the 
overnight rates. Disaggregating the EMFPs for each right-hand-side variables in Equation 
(2.6) reveals further insights on the linkages between the structural changes and the policy 
related variables. Figure 2.7-2.10 shows the variable-specific EMFPs for the four 
interbank interest rate models. 
 
22 
 
 
Figure 2.7. EMFP for individual parameters (overnight SHIBOR) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. EMFP for individual parameters (overnight repo rate) 
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Figure 2.9. EMFP for individual parameters (7-day SHIBOR) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10. EMFP for individual parameters (7-day repo rate) 
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It appears that, during the sample period, significant parameter shifts took place at 
the intercept and the RRR variables in the models for all the four interest rates. In addition, 
the models for the overnight night rates experienced significant parameter shift at the 
benchmark deposit rate variable in late 2007. The shift in the intercept between late 2007 
and early 2008 seems to suggest that an exogenous factor outside of the PBOC’s control 
had moved the unconditional means of the interbank interest rates in 2008. Judging from 
the timing, this factor could either be the market reaction to the global financial crisis or 
the market reaction to government’s stimulus via means other than monetary instruments 
following the financial crisis. The structural changes between late 2010 and early 2011 as 
well as in 2013 were dominated by the changes on how the interbank interest rates 
responded to RRR, indicating that the PBOC might have played a role in these structural 
changes. As described in Section 2.2, the PBOC began enforcing the variable reserve 
requirement scheme described in early 2011, possibly driving up the banks’ liquidity 
preferences and making them more sensitive to RRR changes. Besides, prior to the 
implementation of variable reserve requirement, the PBOC organized two symposia on 
China’s credit market conditions in November and December 2010 respectively. At these 
symposia, the PBOC officials pressed financial institutions to maintain “appropriate” 
credit growth and enhance risk management capability (PBOC, 2011). These measures 
could all contribute to a structural change in the interbank interest rates between late 2010 
and early 2011. There were no apparent regulatory changes by the PBOC in 2013, but the 
timing of the mid-2013 structural change in the 7-day rates coincides with the “SHIBOR 
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shock” 7  which took place on June 20, 2013, when the 7-day SHIBOR and repo 
skyrocketed to double digit, a level previously unseen in the rates’ history.  Multiple news 
reports speculated that the short-lived cash crunch in the interbank market was caused by 
the PBOC temporarily withholding liquidity provision to the banks to curb credit growth 
and to punish those that provided too much credit to the market, particularly through off-
balance-sheet lending (The Economist, 2013; Reuters, 2013). But such an intention has 
not been explicitly acknowledged by the PBOC. Nevertheless, this event could also shift 
the liquidity demand of the banks in the interbank market and alter how the interbank rates 
react to changes in RRR.  
In comparison, there is no evidence that the parameters on the deposit benchmark 
rate and OMO variables were changed at the time when the PBOC’s raised deposit rate 
ceiling or introduced new OMO instruments. Thus, if the interbank rates reacted strongly 
to changes in the deposit benchmark rate before 2011, such reaction would likely remain 
strong in 2015. If the interbank rates did not change much with the OMOs before 2011, 
they would likely remain unresponsive to OMOs in 2015.   
 The exact dates of the structural changes in the AR(p) models are determined by 
following the Bai and Perron (2003) procedure. In order to maintain sufficient sample size 
in each segment for the relatively large number of parameters, the maximum number of 
break points is set to 5 and the minimum number of observations in each segment is set to 
200 in the optimization algorithm. The optimal number of break points and break dates 
for each interbank interest rate is listed in Table 2.2.  
                                                          
7 A term used in the title of The Economist article on this event.  
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Rate Type No. of Break Points Break Dates 
Overnight SHIBOR 2  1/24/2011 6/14/2013 
Overnight Repo 2  1/17/2011 6/14/2013 
7-day SHIBOR 3 6/4/2008 1/24/2011 6/8/2013 
7-day Repo 3 6/4/2008 1/24/2011 6/8/2013 
 
Table 2.2. Dates of structural break points 
 
There is a slight difference in the dates of the break points in 2011 and in 2013 across the 
four interbank rates. But since the break dates in the same year are well within each other’s 
95% confidence interval, the timing of the structural changes in 2011 and in 2013 for the 
four rates are considered the same. Meanwhile, the number of breaks and the break dates 
are generally consistent with what was suggested by the empirical M-fluctuation process. 
The only exception is that the dating algorithm finds the 2013 break point more significant 
than the 2008 break point for the overnight rates, while the EMFP shows otherwise. If 
instead the dating algorithm is forced to search for the optimal break dates for three breaks 
in the models of the overnight rates, the resulting break dates would be nearly identical to 
the ones found in the 7-day rates. For the convenience of cross comparison, the data of all 
the four interbank interest rates are partitioned into four sample periods based on the break 
dates in the 7-day rates. The four periods are specified as 10/9/2006 to 6/3/2008 for Period 
1, 6/4/2008 to 1/21/2011 for Period 2, 1/24/2011 to 6/7/2013 for Period 3, and 6/8/2013 
to 5/29/2015 for Period 4, which are visualized in Figure 2.11. The empirical behavior of 
the interbank interest rates is noticeably different across the four periods in the figure. 
How much differently they react to each policy variable before and after each structural 
change is further examined by the ARMA-EGARCH models fitted separately for each 
rate type and each period.  
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Figure 2.11. The four periods separated by structural changes (Source: authors, NIBFC) 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Results of ARMA-EGARCH models for interbank interest rates 
2.4.2.1 Model fitting 
The optimal sets of (p, q, m, s) in the ARMA(p, q)-EGARCH(m, s) models in the 
four periods defined in Section 2.4.1 are selected based on the criteria specified in Section 
2.3.4 and listed in Table 2.3. 
 
Rate Type Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Overnight 
SHIBOR 
ARMA(2,0)-
EGARCH(1,2) 
ARMA(1,3)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(1,1)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(2,0)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
Overnight 
Repo 
ARMA(3,0)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(2,1)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(2,3)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(2,1)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
7-day 
SHIBOR 
ARMA(2,2)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(1,0)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(2,0)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(2,1)-
EGARCH(1,2) 
7-day Repo 
ARMA(2,0)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(1,0)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
ARMA(1,0)-
EGARCH(1,2) 
ARMA(2,1)-
EGARCH(1,1) 
 
Table 2.3. Optimal settings for the ARMA-EGARCH models 
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The parameter estimates of these models fitted by MLE with generalized error distribution 
are listed in Table 2.4-2.7. Because the deposit benchmark rate only changed in one 
direction in period 1 and period 4, Δ𝑟𝑑,𝑡
−  is excluded from the models for Period 1 and Δ𝑟𝑑,𝑡
+  
is excluded from the models for Period 4. In these 16 models, most of the ARMA and 
GARCH parameters are statistically significant at 1% level, confirming that serial 
correlation and volatility clustering are widely presented in all the four interbank interest 
rate series. The parameter 𝛾 that captures asymmetric volatility response in the EGARCH 
proportion is also significantly positive in all models in Period 1, 2 and 4, suggesting that 
the volatility of the interbank interest rates increased more when the interbank rates rose 
than when the rates dropped. But the sign of 𝛾 is not consistent across rates in Period 3. 
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Overnight SHIBOR 
Mean Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 2.125 *** -6.546 *** 0.176 *** -2.679 *** 
  (0.011)   (0.014)  (0.015)   (0.027)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟏 1.234 *** 0.992 *** 0.997 *** 1.351 *** 
  (0.003)   (0.001)  (0.004)   (0.001)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟐 -0.230 ***       -0.357 *** 
  (0.001)         (0.000)   
𝜺𝒕−𝟏     0.007 *** 0.063 ***    
      (0.000)  (0.002)      
𝜺𝒕−𝟐     0.010 ***        
      (0.000)         
𝜺𝒕−𝟑     0.014 ***        
      (0.000)         
𝒓𝒅,𝒕 0.063 *** 0.729 *** 1.022 *** 0.179 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.003)  (0.019)   (0.002)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 -0.016 *** 0.396 *** -0.030 *** 0.219 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.000)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 0.000 *** 0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 -0.001   0.002 *** 0.138 *** 0.099 *** 
  (0.008)   (0.000) 
 
(0.002)   (0.002)   
Variance Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝝎𝟎 -0.505 * -4.173 *** -2.867 *** 3.299 *** 
  (0.263)   (1.188)  (0.005)   (0.003)   
𝜶𝟏 0.375 *** 0.168 * 0.612 *** 0.286 *** 
  (0.128)   (0.095)  (0.061)   (0.033)   
𝜷𝟏 0.738 *** 0.893 *** 0.893 *** 0.973 *** 
  (0.261)   (0.029)  (0.000)   (0.001)   
𝜷𝟐 0.131            
  (0.239)            
𝜸𝟏 0.702 *** 0.604 *** 0.041 *** 0.105 *** 
  (0.186)   (0.126)  (0.010)   (0.033)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 0.002   0.217 *** 0.123 *** -0.173 *** 
  (0.020)   (0.064)  (0.001)   (0.000)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 -0.004 * -0.004 *** -0.008 *** 0.001   
  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 0.147   1.297 *** -0.028   0.076   
  (0.344)   (0.444)  (0.128)   (0.120)   
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
+  8.907 ** -3.290  13.693 ***    
  (4.128)   (6.095)  (3.385)      
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
−      -1.156  6.991   13.209 *** 
      (2.216)   (5.609)   (1.754)            
 
Table 2.4. Parameter estimates for the ARMA-EGARCH models of overnight SHIBOR rates. 
(*: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%, standard errors in parentheses) 
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Overnight Repo 
Mean Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 1.826 *** -3.689 *** 5.562 *** 3.530 *** 
  (0.010)   (0.127)  (0.042)   (0.045)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟏 1.284 *** 0.980 *** 0.874 *** 1.498 *** 
  (0.002)   (0.003)  (0.001)   (0.001)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟐 -0.172 *** 0.017 *** 0.126 *** -0.498 *** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.001)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟑 -0.110 ***          
 (0.001)            
𝜺𝒕−𝟏     0.016 *** 0.166 *** -0.209 *** 
      (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.007)   
𝜺𝒕−𝟐       0.059 ***    
        (0.001)      
𝜺𝒕−𝟑       0.051 ***    
        (0.001)      
𝒓𝒅,𝒕 0.074 *** 0.793 *** -0.026 *** -0.274 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.031)  (0.002)   (0.005)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 0.013 *** 0.203 *** -0.035 *** 0.235 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.007)  (0.001)   (0.002)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 0.000 *** 0.000  0.000 *** 0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 -0.016 *** 0.002 *** 0.165 *** 0.006    
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.009) 
 
Variance Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝝎𝟎 -0.679 ** -4.150  -2.015 *** -1.259   
  (0.278)   (2.583)  (0.341)   (2.150)   
𝜶𝟏 0.333 *** 0.124  0.467 *** 0.193 * 
  (0.128)   (0.116)  (0.133)   (0.113)   
𝜷𝟏 0.851 *** 0.883 *** 0.900 *** 0.884 *** 
 (0.036)   (0.098)  (0.027)   (0.043)   
𝜸𝟏 0.759 *** 0.651 ** 0.094   0.394 ** 
  (0.180)   (0.284)  (0.163)   (0.154)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 0.014   0.213 * 0.083 *** 0.040   
  (0.021)   (0.129)  (0.018)   (0.103)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 -0.006 *** -0.004 ** -0.007 *** 0.001   
  (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.002)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 0.129   1.617 * 0.281 * 0.192   
  (0.290)   (0.909)  (0.164)   (0.273)   
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
+  9.678 *** 0.737  9.641 **    
  (3.478)   (6.252)  (3.805)      
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
−      -4.578 * 2.852   1.778   
     (2.474)   (4.216)   (3.825)   
 
Table 2.5. Parameter estimates for the ARMA-EGARCH models of overnight repo rates 
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7-day SHIBOR 
Mean Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 1.118 *** -0.238 *** 2.746 *** 4.441 *** 
  (0.004)  (0.010)   (0.001)   (0.060)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟏 0.900 *** 0.993 *** 1.066 *** 1.426 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.001)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟐 0.112 ***     -0.071 *** -0.426 *** 
  (0.001)      (0.000)   (0.001)   
𝜺𝒕−𝟏 0.255 ***         -0.085 *** 
  (0.002)          (0.004)   
𝜺𝒕−𝟐 0.054 ***            
  (0.001)             
𝒓𝒅,𝒕 0.802 *** 0.609 *** 0.993 *** 0.178 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.008)   (0.001)   (0.007)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 -0.031 *** 0.007 *** 0.026 *** 0.087 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 -0.074 *** -0.029 *** 0.029   -0.003 ***  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Variance  Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝝎𝟎 -0.776 *** -3.149 *** -0.348 *** -4.125   
  (0.298)  (0.903)   (0.000)   (2.994)   
𝜶𝟏 0.337 *** 0.227 *** 0.469 *** 0.220 ** 
  (0.106)  (0.060)   (0.000)   (0.099)   
𝜷𝟏 0.985 *** 0.922 *** 0.969 *** 0.586 *** 
  (0.169)  (0.021)   (0.000)   (0.129)   
𝜷𝟐 -0.109          0.297 ** 
  (0.168)          (0.131)   
𝜸𝟏 0.432 ** 0.582 *** -0.224 *** 0.932 *** 
  (0.202)  (0.105)   (0.000)   (0.149)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 0.048 ** 0.166 *** 0.012 *** 0.186   
  (0.020)  (0.050)   (0.000)   (0.147)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 -0.006 *** -0.001   -0.001 *** -0.003   
  (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.002)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 0.101  0.850 *** 0.115 *** -0.252   
  (0.283)  (0.302)   (0.001)   (0.390)   
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
+  -1.049  -3.923   4.560 ***    
  (2.831)  (4.419)   (0.002)      
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
−     -1.608   5.016 *** 4.889   
      (1.593)   (0.273)   (4.803)   
 
Table 2.6. Parameter estimates for the ARMA-EGARCH models of 7-day SHIBOR rates 
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7-day Repo 
Mean Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 0.889 *** 0.323 *** -0.073 *** 4.214 *** 
  (0.010)   (0.017)  (0.007)   (0.082)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟏 1.120 *** 0.994 *** 0.989 *** 1.703 *** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.001)   (0.000)   
𝒓𝒕−𝟐 -0.107 ***       -0.705 *** 
  (0.001)         (0.001)   
𝜺𝒕−𝟏           -0.609 *** 
            (0.009)   
𝒓𝒅,𝒕 0.857 *** 0.590 *** 1.100 *** 0.094 *** 
  (0.007)   (0.010)  (0.001)   (0.005)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 -0.019 *** -0.015 *** 0.036 *** 0.121 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.003)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 0.000   0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 -0.054   -0.040 *** 0.047 * 0.145 *** 
  (0.041)   (0.001)   (0.025)   (0.007)   
Variance Equation Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
𝝎𝟎 -0.538 *** -2.980 *** -0.248 *** -0.568   
  (0.208)   (0.921)  (0.000)   (1.445)   
𝜶𝟏 0.361 *** 0.241 *** 0.397 *** 0.383 *** 
  (0.103)   (0.060)  (0.000)   (0.052)   
𝜷𝟏 0.867 *** 0.912 *** 1.000 *** 0.904 *** 
  (0.041)   (0.024)  (0.000)   (0.023)   
𝜷𝟐       -0.022 ***    
        (0.000)      
𝜸𝟏 0.305 ** 0.592 *** -0.174 *** 0.450 *** 
  (0.152)   (0.112)  (0.000)   (0.058)   
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑳,𝒕 0.027 * 0.154 *** 0.008 *** 0.014   
  (0.016)   (0.050)  (0.000)   (0.071)   
𝑶𝑴𝑶𝒕 -0.008 *** -0.001  0.000 *** 0.001   
  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.001)   
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒏𝒚𝒕 0.074   0.593 * 0.082 *** -0.112   
  (0.271)   (0.316)  (0.001)   (0.289)   
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
+  2.429   -1.026  3.364 ***    
  (2.976)   (3.957)  (0.014)      
𝚫𝒓𝒅,𝒕
−      -1.171  4.220 *** 0.587   
      (1.593)   (0.329)   (3.041)   
 
Table 2.7. Parameter estimates for the ARMA-EGARCH models of 7-day repo rates 
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2.4.2.2 An overview on the interactions between the interbank rates and policy instruments 
The fitted mean equations in Table 2.4-2.7 confirm that the deposit benchmark rate 
and RRR both had statistically significant and sizable impact on the level of the four 
interbank rates, but the deposit benchmark rate had much higher magnitude of impact 
among the two in most periods. With the exception of overnight repo rate, the impact of 
the deposit benchmark rate and RRR was positive over the whole sample. Although the 
parameters of the OMO variable are also statistically significant, their sizes are too small 
to make OMO an economically significant determinant of the interbank interest rates.  
 The fitted variance equations show that only in some periods changing the deposit 
benchmark rate and RRR has significant impact on the volatility of the interbank rates. In 
these periods, changing the deposit benchmark rate and raising RRR both increased the 
interbank interest rate volatility, with the exceptions of overnight repo in Period 2 and 
overnight SHIBOR in Period 4. But the volatility impact of changing the deposit 
benchmark rate was more pronounced than changing RRR. Liquidity drains by OMOs 
generally had a small negative impact on the interest rate volatility, which seems to support 
the claim in previous studies that OMOs were mainly used by the PBOC to smooth the 
market.  
 
2.4.2.3 The impact of structural changes  
The fitted ARMA-EGARCH models confirm that the sign and magnitude of the 
parameters for the policy variables varied across the 4 periods, consistent with the findings 
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from the structural change analysis. Meanwhile, several additional parameter changes not 
captured by the EMFPs are also presented in the results.  
Impact on how the interbank interest rates react to the benchmark deposit rate 
The parameter shift for the deposit benchmark rate variable in the mean equations 
of the overnight SHIBOR and repo rates between Period 1 and Period 2 (see Table 2.8) is 
exactly what was indicated in the EMFPs in Figure 2.7 and 2.8.  
 
Explanatory Variable: 3-month deposit benchmark rate 
Dependent Variable Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Overnight SHIBOR 0.063 0.729 1.022 0.179 
Overnight repo 0.074 0.793 -0.026 -0.274 
7-day SHIBOR 0.802 0.609 0.993 0.178 
7-day repo 0.857 0.590 1.100 0.094 
 
Table 2.8. Comparison of parameter estimates across 4 periods 
 
Before the 2008 structural change, each percentage point change in the deposit benchmark 
rate would contribute only a small change in the overnight rates. But afterwards, it would 
lead to a 70-80 basis points change. In comparison, the 7-day rates were very responsive 
to deposit benchmark rate in both Period 1 and Period 2. The second major change in the 
parameter of the deposit benchmark rate happened between Period 3 and Period 4, which 
was not picked up by the EMFPs. After the structural change in 2013, all the interbank 
rates (except for overnight repo) became much less responsive to the deposit benchmark 
rate. The average change in the interbank rates for each percent change in the deposit 
benchmark rate dropped from around 100 basis points in Period 3 to less than 20 basis 
points in Period 4. It is likely that interest rate liberalization measures in Period 4 
weakened the linkages between the policy rates and the market rates. One may recall that 
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the PBOC removed the lending rate floor in July 2013 and relaxed the deposit rate ceiling 
in November 2014 and March 2015. 
Impact on how the interbank interest rates react to RRR 
The patterns of parameter change for the RRR variable in the mean equations are                   
different between the overnight rates and the 7-day rates (see Table 2.9).  
 
Explanatory Variable: reserve requirement ratio 
Dependent Variable Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Overnight SHIBOR -0.016 0.396 -0.030 0.219 
Overnight repo 0.013 0.203 -0.035 0.235 
7-day SHIBOR -0.031 0.007 0.026 0.087 
7-day repo -0.019 -0.015 0.036 0.121 
 
Table 2.9. Comparison of parameter estimates across 4 periods 
 
The impact of one percentage point increase in RRR on the overnight rates was low in 
Period 1 and Period 3 but high in Period 2 and Period 4. In comparison, the impact of one 
percent increase in RRR on the 7-day rates continuously increased from -2 to -3 basis 
points in Period 1 to around +10 basis points in Period 4. Considering that RRR were 
usually changed by less or equal to 0.5 percent increments, only in Period 4 changing RRR 
had a noticeable impact on the level of the 7-day interbank interest rates. These results 
suggest that only after the June 2013 “SHIBOR shock”, RRR started to play a major role 
in the movements of all the four interbank interest rates.  
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2.4.2.4 Discrepancies across different rate types in their reactions to policy variables 
The ARMA-EGARCH models confirm that the empirical behaviors and reactions 
to the three policy instruments are not consistent across the four rates, and the parameter 
variations across rate types are seemingly associated with the three structural changes. 
Overnight rates vs. 7-day rates 
The discrepancies between the overnight rates and 7-day rates mainly appeared in 
Period 1 and Period 2. In Period 1, the levels of the overnight rates were not very 
responsive to the deposit benchmark rate but their volatility was greatly affected by the 
changes in the deposit benchmark rate. On the contrary, the levels of the 7-day rates had 
significant co-movement with the deposit benchmark rate in Period 1 but their volatility 
did not react much to the changes in the benchmark rate. After the structural change in 
2008, this inconsistency disappeared. Meanwhile, the overnight rates’ responses to RRR 
increased significantly in Period 2, despite the 7-day rates’ small responses to RRR in the 
same period. Based on these observations, whatever caused the structural change in mid-
2008 seems to have led to a closer tie between the overnight rates and the PBOC’s policy 
instruments. Figures 2.12 and 2.13 give a possible explanation on what might have 
facilitated the closer tie. Especially for the repo market, the daily turnover of overnight 
lending started increasing sharply in mid-2008, dramatically widening the gap between 
the daily turnovers of overnight lending and 7-day lending in the following years. As the 
overnight market became much more liquid in Period 2, the overnight rates would likely 
become more responsive to market information and the PBOC’s policy actions. The 
growing popularity among banks in using overnight borrowing rather than longer term 
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borrowing for liquidity needs could be an indication of higher perceived counterparty risk 
in the banking sector in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Daily market turnover: overnight vs. 7-day interbank lending (Source: CEIC) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Daily market turnover: overnight vs. 7-day repos (Source: CEIC) 
 
SHIBOR vs. interbank repo rate 
The results in Section 2.4.2.3 suggest that the overnight SHIBOR and repo rates 
would move in opposite directions amid changes in the deposit benchmark rates in Period 
3 and Period 4, and the 7-day SHIBOR would change twice as much as the 7-day repo 
rate when the deposit benchmark rate was changed in Period 4. Thus, the SHIBOR and 
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repo rates of the same maturity could converge, cross or diverge when the PBOC changed 
the deposit benchmark rate in these periods. Intuitively, the SHIBOR should always 
exceed the repo rate with the same maturity by a risk premium, because the SHIBOR is 
an unsecured rate. But in our sample, the overnight SHIBOR was lower than the overnight 
repo rate on most trading days (except for the first few months after the SHIBOR was 
launched in 2006), and the 7-day SHIBOR was often lower than 7-day repo rate in Period 
4. Figures 2.14 and 2.15 visualizes the overnight and 7-day SHIBOR-repo spreads vs. 
deposit benchmark rate.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Overnight SHIBOR-repo spread vs. deposit benchmark rate (Source: authors, PBOC) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15. 7-day SHIBOR-repo spread vs. deposit benchmark rate (Source: authors, PBOC) 
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In Figure 2.14, the three raises in the deposit benchmark rate in Period 3 coincided with 
the three spikes in the overnight SHIBOR-repo spread. Meanwhile, each drop in the 
deposit benchmark rate in Period 3 and 4 was accompanied by a widened and persistent 
negative SHIBOR-repo spread, particularly in late 2014 and early 2015. The 7-day 
SHIBOR-repo spread (Figure 2.15) was less affected by the deposit benchmark rate in 
Period 3, but became rather negative when the deposit benchmark rate was lowered in 
Period 4.  
The widening negative spread between the SHIBOR and repo rates in recent years 
is puzzling. A plausible conjecture for its cause is the market segmentation between the 
secured and unsecured interbank markets and the market power of large state-owned 
commercial banks being compounded by the structural changes in 2011 and 2013. The 
negative SHIBOR-repo spread could not have been sustainable if banks could freely 
arbitrage between the secured and unsecured interbank markets. In reality, some 
borrowers on the repo market, such as smaller regional bank and non-bank institutions 
that usually have tighter liquidity positions than the large banks, might have been restricted 
from borrowing in the unsecured market, thereby creating an imbalance of liquidity 
demand in the two markets. Such imbalance could be amplified when the market was 
tighten by the PBOC, leading to an even wider gap between SHIBOR and the repo rates, 
which was exactly what happened after the structural changes in early 2011 and mid-2013. 
The widened liquidity demand gap between the secured and unsecured markets following 
the 2011 structural change might also enable large state-owned banks to exert market 
power to borrow low from the unsecured market and lend at a higher rate in the repo 
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market with minimal risk. According to the data provided in Cassola and Porter (2013), 
large state-owned banks became net borrowers on the unsecured market since the first 
quarter in 2011 but maintain their net lenders role on the repo market, while the other 
banks became net lenders on the unsecured market since 2011 but remained net borrowers 
on the repo market. The timing of the switch coincides with the structural change in early 
2011. The presumed market power of the large national banks could also explain why the 
SHIBOR-repo spread became more negative when the deposit benchmark rate was 
lowered. The dominance of large banks in the deposit market might force small banks to 
compete with them using higher deposit rates, making the demand clearing deposit rate 
higher for small banks than large banks. Lowering the deposit benchmark rate would make 
it more difficult for small banks to meet their demand for deposits than large banks, 
because the lower deposit rate ceiling will squeeze their room to raise rates above large 
banks’. As a result, the smaller banks might seek additional financing from the repo market 
if the unsecured interbank market was off-limits to them, in turn driving up the repo rates. 
In addition, alternative investment opportunities and deteriorating quality of the 
repo collateral pool could also contribute to the increasingly negative SHIBOR-repo 
spread in Period 3 and Period 4. Fan and Zhang (2007) explained the interest rate 
discrepancy in China’s interbank repo market and exchange-traded repo market based on 
different alternative investment opportunities of the funds raised in these two markets. A 
similar case could be made for the discrepancy between the unsecured and secured 
interbank markets. Chu, Wen and He (2010) reported increasing use of discounted short-
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term bills and corporate medium-term notes as collateral for interbank repos, which could 
lead to higher risk in the interbank repo market. 
 
2.5 Summary and Policy Implications 
2.5.1 Major findings 
Section 2.4 provides detailed answers to our research questions. The empirical 
results indicate 2-3 structural changes in the SHIBOR and interbank repo rates at June 
2008, January 2011 and June 2013 respectively. The structural change in 2008 was likely 
related to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, while the structural changes in 2011 and 
2013 could be attributed to the PBOC’s announced or unannounced operational changes 
during these years. The four interbank interest rates reacted differently to the PBOC’s 
deposit benchmark rate and RRR adjustments following each structural change, but 
remained unresponsive to OMOs even after the most recent structural change, except for 
their volatility. Following the structural break in June 2013, the linkage between the 
interbank rates and the deposit benchmark rate weakened and the linkage between the 
interbank rate and RRR strengthened. The discrepancies between the overnight rates and 
the 7-day rates in terms of their reactions to the policy instruments mainly presented before 
the January 2011 structural change, while the discrepancies between SHIBOR and the 
repo rates of the same maturity mainly appeared after the January 2011 structural change. 
Particularly since the 2013 structural change, the negative spread between SHIBOR and 
the repo rates widened whenever the deposit benchmark rate was lower by the PBOC.  
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2.5.2 Key implications for policy makers 
a. Any insights provided by empirical studies on China’s interbank interest rate based 
on pre-2011 data should be viewed with caution in guiding current or future policies due 
to structural changes. 
b. The PBOC’s benchmark interest rates seem to be an effective tool to guide the 
interbank interest rate, but their impact dropped significantly following the relaxing of 
restrictions on the interest rates of bank loans and deposits. As the PBOC eventually raises 
the deposit rate ceiling to an extent that it is no longer a binding restriction for banks, the 
deposit benchmark rate might become obsolete, which is a sign of progress for the 
transition of the interest system. It also means that the PBOC will have to rely more on 
the remaining instruments such as RRR and OMOs to maintain control over the short-term 
interest bank interest rates. Currently, RRR seems to be the preferable instrument to guide 
the interbank interest rate, because the interbank interest rate became more responsive to 
changes in RRR since the implementation of variable reserve requirement in 2011 and the 
“SHIBOR shock” in 2013. Yet, using RRR as the primary instrument to influence the 
interbank interest rate has its own limitations. According to Ma, Yan and Liu (2011), the 
range the PBOC can adjust RRR depends heavily on the scale of its foreign exchange 
interventions, because RRR is its main foreign exchange sterilization tool. Meanwhile, 
according to the same study, increasing RRR adds cost to financial intermediation, 
because it is an implicit tax burden imposed on banks. In order for OMOs to become a 
price signal for the interbank market rather than merely a remedy for market volatility, the 
PBOC may need to explicitly specify a rate target for its OMOs. For example, it can 
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choose a SHIBOR rate of a specific maturity as its target rate. He and Wang (2012) found 
that certain market interest rates were responsive to the PBOC’s repo issuance rates. Yet, 
it is difficult to use the interest rate on the PBOC-issued repos as a direct price signal, 
because the PBOC repos have different maturities and their rates can be determined by 
either a price auction based on a preset quantity or a quantity auction based on a preset 
interest rate.  
c. The 7-day SHIBOR and interbank repo rates seem to be preferable to the overnight 
rates for the role of market benchmark rates. After the structural change in January 2011, 
the 7-day rates generally moved in the same direction as the PBOC’s policy instruments, 
making them better signals for the PBOC’s policy intentions. However, the rather high 
volatility in the 7-day rates might make them too noisy to serve as benchmark rates, which 
demands further attention from the PBOC.  
d. The widening negative spread between SHIBOR and the repo rates as well as the 
discrepancies between their responses to adjustments in the deposit benchmark rate after 
the structural changes in 2011 and 2013 signaled increased market segmentation between 
two interbank markets as well as strengthened market power of the large state-owned 
banks. This situation could be a threat to China’s finance sector and a complication for the 
PBOC’s monetary transmission via interest rate channel. The negative risk premium of 
the SHIBOR over the repo rate indicated that the risks in the two interbank markets were 
not priced correctly, potentially resulting in extensive price distortions among the debts 
and financial assets that track the SHIBOR or repo rates. Meanwhile, substantially 
different or even opposite reactions between SHIBOR and repo rates to the deposit 
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benchmark rate adjustments since 2011 suggested that the PBOC’s price signals might be 
transmitted unevenly in the two interbank markets, making it more difficult for the PBOC 
to achieve its policy goal with the benchmark rate instrument. Cassola and Porter (2013) 
suggested that removing the divisions in the bond market, strengthening existing standing 
facilities and liberalizing financial prices could address the anomalies between the 
unsecured and secured rates. There are also other potential measures to eliminate the 
interbank market segmentation and counter the market power of large banks, such as 
allowing more financial institutions to participate in the unsecured market and removing 
the deposit rate ceiling for small regional banks before doing so for the large national 
banks.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE TRANSMISSION OF LIQUIDITY SHOCKS INTO AND OUT OF CHINA’S 
BANKING SECTOR VIA CHINA’S SEGMENTED MONEY MARKET: 
EVIDENCE FROM RECENT MARKET EVENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This study is largely inspired by the studies that documented how liquidity shocks 
were transmitted via transactions in the U.S. money market during the 2007 U.S. subprime 
crisis, such as Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2012). Compared to the U.S., 
the financial system in China is generally perceived to be less interconnected due to 
various degrees of market segmentation and policy restrictions. However, in recent years, 
the booming money market transactions, such as repurchase agreements (repo), among 
banks and other institutional investors may have created pathways that can circumvent the 
segmentation and restrictions, and allow liquidity shocks to spread between China's 
closely guarded banking sector8 and the rest of its financial system during liquidity-related 
financial market events. The existence of such pathways could threaten the overall 
stability of China's financial system, but this has not been covered in the previous literature. 
Therefore, the primary objective of this paper is to provide an anatomy of the pathways 
created by money market transactions in China that are capable of transmitting liquidity 
shocks into and out of China's banking sector, and to empirically assess how these 
pathways have functioned over the last five years. Specifically, we want to examine their 
                                                          
8 The banking sector in China does not include investment banks, which are called securities firms in China. 
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involvement in two of the most dramatic financial market events that took place in China 
during this period, namely the rollercoaster ride in China's stock market between late-2014 
and mid-2015 and the “SHIBOR Shock”, a short-lived but severe cash crunch in China's 
banking sector in mid-2013. Given the fact that China's banking sector has always been 
strictly prohibited from trading the in the stock market, these two market events provide 
an the ideal opportunity to explore whether or not a liquidity shock originated from a 
market inaccessible by the banks could affect the liquidity condition of banking sector via 
the money market, and whether or not a liquidity shock originated from the banking sector 
could affect the liquidity condition of a market that the banks do not have direct access to 
via the money market. 
 
3.2 Background 
 Before presenting the methodology and results, we first provide a detailed 
background on how money market transactions create transmission paths for liquidity 
shocks across financial assets and financial institutions and how they may function 
differently in China due to China's unique market structure. To avoid ambiguity, we 
explicitly specify the realm of money market in this paper as the wholesale credit market 
for short-term debt securities and credit instruments with maturities of one year or less. 
 
3.2.1 The transmission paths for liquidity shocks created by money market transactions 
The money market's ability to transmit liquidity shocks across different parts of a 
financial system stems from its role as the central hub for short-term liquidity. In a modern 
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financial system, the money market provides a venue for institutional investors to keep 
their cash in highly liquid and relatively safe short-term assets, such as treasury bills and 
commercial papers, and earn better interest rates than cash positions. At the same time, 
the money market provides institutional investors a platform to borrow short-term funds 
from each other with collateralized and uncollateralized instruments, such as repurchase 
agreements (repos) and call loans, in order to support the crucial functions in their day-to-
day operations. For example, financial institutions raise funds from the money market to 
finance securitized lending; wholesale investors obtain funds from the money market to 
make leveraged trades; brokerage firms borrow from the money market to finance the 
margins they provide to retail investors; and commercial banks trade their reserve cash 
with each other in the money market to satisfy their capital and reserve requirements 
imposed by regulators.  
Following Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we consider the term liquidity in 
two different aspects: the market liquidity of assets, i.e. the ease with which they are traded, 
and the funding liquidity of traders, i.e. the ease with which they can obtain funding. Based 
on these two aspects of liquidity, we characterize the transmission paths of liquidity shocks 
facilitated by money market transactions into three types: 1. the co-movement of funding 
illiquidity between lenders and borrowers; 2. the co-movement between the market 
illiquidity of assets and the funding illiquidity of their traders; and 3. the co-movement of 
market illiquidity across multiple assets. These three types of transmission paths often 
function together and reinforce each other.  
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It is obvious that when a trader (e.g. a financial institution) is hit by a funding 
liquidity problem, the funding liquidity of the other traders it finances will also be tighten. 
Meanwhile, the market liquidity of multiple assets in the trader's portfolio will likely be 
negatively affected as well, because the trader may be forced to liquidate part of the 
portfolio to cope with the liquidity issue. However, in order for a liquidity shock originated 
from the market illiquidity of an asset to affect the funding liquidity of its traders, and for 
a local shock originally affecting only a few assets and traders to spread out and affect the 
whole financial system via the money market, the market participants need to be 
substantially reliant on levered funds from the money market via repos, margins and other 
instruments. According to Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), increasing market 
illiquidity of an asset leads to its increasing price volatility, which in turn drives up the 
repo haircut9 or margin requirement for the asset to be used as collateral, because the repo 
haircut or margin requirement of an asset is adjusted based on volatility. Suppose a trader 
invests in an asset and uses it as repo (or margin) collateral to borrow short-term funds. It 
can then use the funds to replenish its cash position, to make new trades and to finance 
other traders. When the asset used as collateral is hit by a liquidity shock, its repo haircut 
(or margin requirement) rises, forcing the trader to raise new funds from the money market 
and to withdraw its financing to other traders, subsequently reducing the funds available 
for other traders. This interaction between market liquidity and funding liquidity created 
by repo transaction (or margin trade) allows the liquidity shock to transmit from an asset 
to multiple traders. When the funding liquidity of these traders is worsen to an extent that 
                                                          
9 Repo haircut is the difference between the market value of repo collateral and the amount of funds obtained by repo 
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they are no longer able borrow new funds from the money market, they are then forced to 
fire-sale their asset holdings, in turn driving up the market illiquidity of multiple assets 
simultaneously. Furthermore, if these affected assets are also used as repo (or margin) 
collateral by other traders, then the liquidity shock will be transmitted to these traders and 
the assets in their portfolios as well, ultimately resulting in system-wide illiquidity 
contagion. In fact, if we replace the initially affected asset and the traders in this 
hypothetical example by the asset-backed commercial papers (ABCPs) tied to subprime 
mortgages and the Wall Street banks, respectively, our example becomes a partial 
illustration of how the initial problem in the subprime mortgage market was able to affect 
the liquidity of assets and financial institutions seemingly unrelated to subprime mortgage, 
and eventually led to a system-wide liquidity crunch during the 2007 subprime crisis. This 
is documented with more details in Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2012). 
From the above illustration, it is straightforward to infer that the three types of 
illiquidity co-movements among different assets and market participants will strengthen 
when a liquidity shock spreads among them, and will weaken once their market/funding 
liquidity improves, which is supported by Brunnermeier and Pederson's (2009) theoretical 
model and empirically shown to hold during the 2007 subprime crisis by Frank, Gonzalez-
Hermosillo and Hesse (2008). Therefore, if we can specify the empirical measures for the 
funding illiquidity levels of major entities engaging in money market transactions in China, 
as well as the market illiquidity levels of major assets being traded in or financed by the 
money market in China, we can then explore how liquidity shocks are transmitted among 
them by tracking the strength of co-movements among these illiquidity measures. 
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3.2.2 The obstructed transmission paths in China’s segmented money market 
According to the assessment in Section 3.2.1, if we ignore the restrictions and 
segmentation in China's financial system, there are three potential paths through which 
money market transactions can transmit liquidity shocks between the banking sector and 
the stock market in China: 1. through the interaction between the funding illiquidity of the 
banking sector and the funding illiquidity of stock traders, if the banks provide financing 
to stock traders via the money market; 2. through the interaction between the funding 
illiquidity of the banking sector and the market illiquidity of equity assets, if the banks 
trade stocks with funds borrowed from the money market; 3. and through the interaction 
between the market illiquidity of stocks and the market illiquidity of assets used by banks 
as collateral to borrow from the money market. However, in reality, the second path is 
nonexistent because the banks in China are barred from trading in the stock market, and 
the third path is severely obstructed by the segmentation in China's money market, leaving 
the first path the most susceptible for transmitting liquidity shocks between the banking 
sector and the stock market. In the rest of this subsection, we explain in detail why this is 
the case and discuss how China's money market structure affects how we conduct our 
analysis.  
Based on China's money market structure, we visualize how China's banking 
sector interacts with other traders via financing and trading activities in China's segmented 
money market with Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. China’s segmented money market and how it connects different traders and assets 
(Source: authors) 
 
 
Because the money market is a submarket within the overall credit market, the 
segmentation in China's money market is a direct result of the artificial division of China's 
credit market into two parts: the interbank credit market mainly reserved for banks and 
institutional investors, and the exchanged-based credit market mainly reserved for 
investors with access to China's two stock exchanges, which was previously described by 
Fan and Zhang (2007). Although the interconnectivity between the two markets has been 
greatly improved over the years, several major restrictions remain in place. With the 
exception of the 16 publicly listed commercial banks, no other banks are allowed to trade 
in the exchange market. Even for the 16 banks, the access to the exchange market has been 
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partial, because they were prohibited from conducting exchange-based repo (ER) 
transactions until July, 2014 and are still prohibited from trading stocks and convertible 
bonds. On the other hand, the interbank credit market is generally off-limits to retail 
investors. Currently, only non-bank institutions, such as insurance companies, securities 
firms, fund management companies and qualified corporations can have relatively 
unrestricted access to the two markets, in the sense that they can have accounts in both 
markets, can trade securities (including stocks) and borrow funds in both markets, and can 
transfer funds and certain debt securities between their accounts in the two markets, albeit 
with cumbersome procedures and delays. Under the current market setting, the banks can 
still supply funds to the stock market by financing non-bank institutional investors in the 
interbank and exchange-based money markets, despite the market segmentation.  
Along with the differentiated market access for different participant types, the 
security types in the two markets are also differentiated. Almost all short-term debt 
securities in the realm of money market are exclusively traded in the interbank money 
market, except for the short-term treasury bonds (TBs) that are occasionally issued in the 
exchange market. The major security types in the interbank money market include short-
term TBs, short-term policy financial bonds (PFBs), which is a popular type of quasi-
government bonds issued by government-backed policy banks, short-term central bank 
bills (CBs) used by the PBOC as an open market operation tool, and short-term corporate 
debts in the forms of commercial papers (CPs) and medium-term notes (MTNs). Because 
these securities cannot be traded in or transferred into the exchange market, where stocks 
are traded, they cannot be held in the same portfolio with stocks. As a result, the direct 
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interaction between their market liquidity and the market liquidity of stocks are 
significantly limited.  
In addition, the funding sources for participants in the two money markets are also 
differentiated. There are two main funding sources in the interbank money market. Most 
of the institutions with access to this market can borrow with interbank repos (IRs) 
collateralized by interbank market assets. Qualified institutions can also obtain short-term 
funds from the interbank call loan (CL) market, an uncollateralized market mainly created 
for banks to trade their cash reserves with each other in order to satisfy the reserve 
requirement set by the PBOC, similar to the function of the Federal Funds market. The 
CL market also shares some commonalities with the Eurodollar market, because its 
benchmark interest rate SHIBOR is determined by a board of banks like the Libor, and 
not targeted by the central bank. In practice, non-bank institutions and smaller regional 
banks may find it difficult to borrow from the CL market due to its high credit requirement, 
thus having to rely more on the IR market for funding needs. This is evident by Cassola 
and Porter (2013)'s finding that small banks are usually net borrowers in the IR market but 
net lenders in the CL market, while the opposite is true for large national banks. In the 
exchange-based money market, traders can finance with ERs collateralized by credit assets 
in the exchange market. However, this funding source comes with significant restrictions, 
particularly for the retail investors. First, repo collaterals are difficult to accumulate in the 
exchange market, because exchange-based bonds are largely held by major financial 
institutions. Secondly, there are stringent requirements for retail investors to borrow with 
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repo, such as having at least 500 thousand yuan in net asset value and a track record of 
active bond trading.  
Given all the restrictions in China's public financial markets, the over-the-counter 
(OTC) “wealth-management products”10 (WMPs) become an important supplement to 
them, because the regulators do not prohibit certain financial innovations by the banks 
through WMPs. For example, a bank can create a WMP funded by private parties, 
including many of its depositors, to finance the margins provided by securities firms to 
their customers. The off-balance-sheet status of these WMPs allows the banks to supply 
extra funds to the exchange-based credit and stock markets, skirting the reserve and capital 
requirements imposed on their balance-sheets and the restrictions in the public markets. 
Due to the non-standard nature of WMPs and their limited data availability, we do not 
explicitly account for their impact in this study. However, the transmission of liquidity 
shocks via WMPs could be partially captured by our analysis based on data from the two 
public money markets, because the WMPs are partially funded by the banking sector, and 
some of traders financed by WMPs might have access to the public money markets at the 
same time.    
 The Co-movements 1 and 2 highlighted in Figure 3.1 are the main focus in the rest 
of this paper. Co-movement 1 represents the co-movement between the funding liquidity 
of traders funded by the interbank money market and the funding liquidity of traders 
funded by the exchange-based money market. It can be viewed as a proxy for the 
interaction between the funding liquidity conditions of the banking sector and the stock 
                                                          
10 A term used in China to represent uninsured financial products sold by banks and other financial institutions. 
55 
 
traders, which is the primary transmission path for liquidity shocks between the banking 
sector and the stock market as we have discussed. We expect Co-movement 1 to strengthen 
when a liquidity shock affects either side of the market segmentation and drives up cross-
market fund movements. Co-movement 2 represents the co-movement between the 
funding liquidity of traders funded by the interbank money market and the market liquidity 
of short-term assets traded and used as repo collateral in the interbank money market. 
Although Co-movement 2 is not a major transmission path for shocks between the banking 
sector and the stock market, its strength can serve as a key indicator for the stress level at 
the banking sector. Because the short-term debt securities in the interbank market do not 
have direct interaction with stocks, their market liquidity is expected to be mainly affected 
by the funding liquidity of their traders, who are most likely the banks being confined in 
the interbank market and having no access to the other short-term assets. Adding the fact 
that short-term debt securities are the easiest to liquidate in a credit market, we expect Co-
movement 2 to rise sharply when the funding of the banks are tightened to a point that 
they have to sell a substantial amount assets to deal with cash shortage. In summary, 
strengthening Co-movement 1 is an indication that the funding liquidity of the banking 
sector is more closely tied to the funding liquidity of stock traders, while strengthening 
Co-movement 2 is a confirmation that a liquidity shock capable of affecting the stability 
of the banking sector has taken place. If Co-movements 1 and 2 strengthen at the same 
time, it is a strong evidence that either a liquidity shock originated from the stock market 
is being transmitted into the banking sector, or a liquidity shock originated from the 
banking sector is being transmitted into the stock market.  
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3.3 Methodology  
In order to examine the two types of liquidity/illiquidity co-movements described 
in Section 3.2, we need to specify empirical measures for the funding liquidity of traders 
in China's interbank money market and exchange-based money market, as well as the 
market liquidity of assets in the interbank money market. We then need to construct a 
model to capture the co-movements among these liquidity measures. In the next three 
subsections, we detail our liquidity measures, our data and our empirical model. 
 
3.3.1 Measuring funding liquidity and market liquidity 
For traders in the interbank money market, we use two variants of liquidity 
measures to represent their funding liquidity, one based on IR and one based on CL. The 
measure based on IR is more representative of the funding liquidity of small regional 
banks and non-bank institutions in the interbank money market, because they are more 
likely to be able to borrow in the IR market than the CL market as mentioned in Section 
3.2.2. The measure based on CL is more representative of the funding liquidity of large 
national banks. For traders in the exchange-based money market, we use the liquidity 
measure of ER to represent their funding liquidity. We also include two variants of 
liquidity measures of assets in the interbank money market, one based on PFB and one 
based on CP. The measure based on PFB is more representative of the market liquidity of 
short-term government debts, while the measure based on CP is more representative of the 
market liquidity of short-term corporate debts. 
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We specify our liquidity measures in a way that is consistent with Brunnermeier 
and Pederson (2009)'s theoretical model and similar measures in the U.S. market. In 
Brunnermeier and Pederson's (2009) model, the illiquidity level of a security is 
represented by the absolute deviation of its market price from its fundamental value. 
Because the prices of debt securities are usually quoted in interest rates rather than prices, 
it is more convenient for us to measure the price deviations for debt securities based on 
interest rate spreads. An example of such rate spread is the Libor-OIS spread, which is 
used in numerous studies on the 2007 U.S. subprime crisis as a proxy for risk and liquidity 
condition in the money market (see Frank, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Hesse (2008), 
Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2012)). The Libor-OIS spread is the 
difference between the U.S. Dollar Libor rate, a reference interest rate for unsecured 
interbank lending of Eurodollar, and the fixed rate for Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) that 
tracks the Fed Funds effective rate. It can be considered the premium of a bank's borrowing 
cost in the money market over a baseline rate subjected to little risk and liquidity concerns. 
It seems straightforward for us to adopt a Chinese equivalent to the Libor-OIS spread, i.e. 
the difference between SHIBOR and the fixed rate of an overnight interest rate swap (IRS) 
similar to the OIS, as the measure of illiquidity for CLs in China. However, there are two 
potential issues with this approach. First, the roles of Libor-OIS spread and its Chinese 
equivalent as liquidity measures can be complicated by the impact of credit risk on Libor 
and SHIBOR, due to their nature as unsecured rates. Both Frank and Hesse (2009) and 
Smith (2012) have shown that Libor-OIS spread contains a component for liquidity risk 
(i.e. the risk of solvent counterparties having unexpected cash constraints to meet 
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obligations) as well as a component for credit risk (i.e. the risk of loss due to insolvency 
of counterparties). Yet, because major banks in China are perceived to be backed by the 
government against insolvency because of their major or partial government ownership, 
the credit risk component in a SHIBOR-based spread is likely trivial. Secondly, the 
availability of China's IRS rate data is rather spotty due to infrequent IRS transactions in 
China, making the SHIBOR-OIS spread impractical. To circumvent this issue, we use the 
spread between SHIBOR and the TB yield instead. The SHIBOR-TB spread can be 
considered the Chinese equivalent to the TED spread, i.e. the difference between Libor 
and the U.S. Treasury bill (T-bill) yield, which is commonly used analogously to the 
Libor-OIS spread.   
Similarly, we use the IR-TB spread, ER-TB spread, CP-TB spread and PFB-TB 
spread to represent the illiquidity levels of IRs, ERs, CPs and PFBs, respectively. Most of 
these rate spreads have their counterparts in studies on the U.S. market. The IR-TB and 
ER-TB spreads are comparable to the U.S. Repo-Tbill spread suggested by Bai, 
Krishnamurthy and Weymuller (2016) as a preferred measure for the liquidity condition 
in the U.S. banking sector. The CP-TB spread in China is an imperfect equivalent to the 
U.S. ABCP-Tbill spread used by Frank, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Hesse (2008) as a 
measure of liquidity condition in the U.S. ABCP market. Unlike the ABCPs in the U.S., 
the CPs in China are all non-asset-backed variants, thus are not protected against credit 
risk. To minimize the impact of credit risk, we specifically use the yield of AAA-rated CP 
to calculate the CP-TB spread. The PFB-TB spread is unique to the Chinese market. The 
PFBs are quasi-government bonds issued by the government-designated policy banks to 
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support large public projects, such as infrastructure projects, while the TBs are directly 
issued by the government. Unlike certain short-term TBs that can be traded in both markets, 
the short-term PFBs are only traded in the interbank market, and are generally priced with 
a premium over TBs. According to Wan (2006), the difference in pricing between PFB 
and TB is not only attributed to their liquidity difference but also attributed to the 
difference in tax policies for their interest returns. To remedy this issue, we explicitly 
account for the impact of tax differences in our model.  
 
3.3.2 The data 
The five rate spreads specified in Section 3.3.1 are calculated from the weekly 
averages of six daily interest rates with 1-month maturity for the period between June 17, 
2011, the earliest date when all the six rates are available, and April 8, 2016. Our original 
data consists of 1-month SHIBOR published by NIBFC, the weighted average 1-month 
interbank repo rate and the 1-month CP, PFB and TB yields collected from CEIC Data, 
and the daily closing rate of the standardized exchange repo GC028 listed in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange. We specifically choose the 1-month maturity to maximize data 
availability, because repos with maturities over a month are infrequent in China, while the 
PFBs and TBs with less than a month maturities are nonexistent. We also use weekly 
averages to eliminate excess noise in the daily data, which may be caused by the day of 
week liquidity effect and the routine open market operations by the PBOC. The six interest 
rates and the calculated 1-month rate spreads are displayed in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 
respectively.  
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Figure 3.2. Weekly averages of the six daily interest rates (Source: CEIC Data, NIBFC, Sohu 
Finance) 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The five interest rate spreads as liquidity measures (Source: authors) 
 
According to Figure 3.2, the TB yield is generally the lowest among the six interest rates 
while the CP yield is generally the highest, which is consistent with their risk and liquidity 
characteristics. Meanwhile, the difference between SHIBOR and IR rates is very small, 
suggesting the credit risk component in SHIBOR is indeed trivial. In Figure 3.3, our 
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liquidity measures (i.e. the illiquidity levels represented by the rate spreads) fluctuate 
violently with a range up to 500 basis points, which is unusual among similar rate spreads 
in the U.S. 
 
3.3.3 Modelling the co-movements of liquidity measures 
Because we adopt two variants of funding liquidity measures as well as two 
variants of market liquidity measures for the interbank money market, our model is tasked 
to measure six variants of liquidity co-movements rather than two, including two versions 
of Co-movement 1 and four versions of Co-movement 2. The six variants of liquidity co-
movements are visualized in Figure 3.4.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. The six liquidity co-movements to be measured by the empirical model (Source: authors) 
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In Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009)'s theoretical model, the co-movement 
between the liquidity conditions of two securities is represented by the covariance of the 
liquidity measures of these two securities. Based on this concept, the co-movements 
among the five liquidity measures in this study are represented by their covariance matrix 
or correlation matrix, which can be viewed as the covariance matrix adjusted for individual 
volatilities. Obviously, the six co-movements highlighted in Figure 3.4 are elements in the 
correlation matrix. By adopting this concept, our task then becomes estimating the time-
varying correlation matrix among the five liquidity measures. A multivariate volatility 
model, such as the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model specified by Engle 
(2002), seems to be ideal for the task. In fact, a modified DCC-GARCH model has already 
been used by Frank, Gonzales-Hermosillo and Hesse (2008) to empirically examine the 
spillovers of liquidity shocks during the 2007 subprime crisis. The DCC-GARCH model 
and similar time-varying correlation multivariate GARCH models have also been used to 
study the other aspects of cross-market and cross-asset co-movements, such as the co-
movements in returns and volatilities. For example, Chiang, Joen and Li (2007) study the 
cross-market financial contagion among Asian markets based on a DCC-GARCH model 
of stock returns. Yang, Zhou and Wang (2009) document the time-varying correlation 
between stock and bond market returns in the U.S. for the past 150 years using a smooth 
transition multivariate GARCH model. Arouri, Jouini and Nguyen (2011) examine the 
volatility transmission between oil and stock markets in Europe and the U.S. using a VAR-
GARCH model. 
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Most of these studies use multiple bivariate models to estimate the time-varying 
correlation for each pair of assets or markets. Instead of following their approach, we 
estimate the time-varying correlation matrix of the five liquidity measures with a single 
penta-variate DCC-GARCH model. We expect the six co-movements to interact with each 
other, so we estimate them together in one model. In our model, the conditional means of 
the five rate spreads are assumed to follow an AR(1) process and the conditional 
covariance matrix is assumed to follow a multivariate DCC(1, 1)-GARCH(1, 1) process. 
The AR(1) model for the PFB-TB spread include an additional variable to account for the 
impact of different tax policies for PFB and TB. The mean equations for the interest rate 
spreads are specified as 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ,      𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4                                              (3.1) 
𝑥5,𝑡 = 𝜇5 + 𝜙5𝑥5,𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝐵𝑡 + 𝑟5,𝑡                                             (3.2) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = √ℎ𝑖,𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,      𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5                                            (3.3) 
where 𝑥1,𝑡 is the SHIBOR-TB spread, 𝑥2,𝑡 is the IR-TB spread, 𝑥3,𝑡 is the ER-TB spread, 
𝑥4,𝑡 is the CP-TB spread, 𝑥5,𝑡 is the PFB-TB spread, 𝐵𝑡 is the 1-month TB yield, ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the 
conditional variance of innovations, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a standardized disturbance with mean zero 
and variance one. The intuition behind using the TB yield variable to capture the impact 
of tax difference is straightforward. Suppose PFB has comparable risk and liquidity 
characteristics as TB, but its interest payment is taxable as opposed to the tax-free TB, the 
theoretical interest rate for PFB 𝐼5,𝑡  should satisfy the following relationship 𝐼5,𝑡 =
1/(1 − 𝑇) ∗ 𝐵𝑡  where 𝑇 is the tax rate. In this case, 𝑥5,𝑡 = 𝐼5,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑇/(1 − 𝑇) ∗ 𝐵𝑡 . 
Thus, the difference between 𝐼5,𝑡  and 𝐵𝑡  contributed by tax difference should be 
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proportional to the yield of TB. The reason for not using a specific tax rate 𝑇 to directly 
calculate 𝑇/(1 − 𝑇) is because tax policies regarding interest payments from PFBs differ 
for different type of institutions. In this case, estimating 𝑇/(1 − 𝑇) with a parameter 𝜏 is 
a preferable approach to approximate the average impact of tax across different types of 
institutions. 
Our DCC(1, 1)-GARCH(1, 1) model for the conditional correlations is specified 
based on Engle (2002)'s formulation. But unlike the original model, we assume that the 
innovation vector 𝒓𝒕 = [𝑟1,𝑡, 𝑟2,𝑡, 𝑟3,𝑡, 𝑟4,𝑡, 𝑟5,𝑡]
′
 follows a multivariate Student's t 
distribution instead of a multivariate normal distribution to account for fat tails. Suppose 
we define the covariance of the innovation as 𝑯𝒕 = 𝑫𝒕𝑹𝒕𝑫𝒕 where 𝑫𝒕 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{√ℎ𝑖,𝑡} and 
𝑹𝒕 is the time varying correlation matrix. Our DCC model can be specified as 
𝒓𝒕| =𝒕−𝟏∼ 𝒕(𝟎, 𝑫𝒕𝑹𝒕𝑫𝒕)                                                                                          (3.4) 
𝑫𝒕
𝟐 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝜔𝑖} + 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝜅𝑖} ∘ 𝒓𝒕−𝟏𝒓𝒕−𝟏
′ + 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝜆𝑖} ∘ 𝑫𝒕−𝟏
𝟐  , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5                   (3.5) 
𝜺𝒕 = 𝑫𝒕
−𝟏𝒓𝒕                                          (3.6) 
𝑸𝒕 = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑺 + 𝛼𝜺𝒕−𝟏𝜺𝒕−𝟏
′ + 𝛽𝑸𝒕−𝟏                                (3.7) 
𝑹𝒕 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝑸𝒕}
−1/2𝑸𝒕𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{𝑸𝒕}
−1/2                                 (3.8) 
𝑺 = 𝑬[𝜺𝒕𝜺𝒕
′]                                     (3.9) 
where 𝜺𝒕 = ⌊𝜀𝑖,𝑡⌋ , 𝑸𝒕 = ⌊𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡⌋ , 𝑹𝒕 = ⌊𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡⌋ , {ωi, 𝜅𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}  are the parameters to be 
estimated and ∘ denotes Hadamard product. Equation (3.5) governs the GARCH process 
and Equation (3.7) governs the DCC process. Equation (3.7) can be interpreted as a 
GARCH(1,1) process for the conditional correlation matrix. Each element of 𝑸𝒕 satisfies 
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𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛼(𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛽( 𝑞𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑗) with ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 being the unconditional 
correlation between 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡.  
Based on the assumption of Student's t distribution in Equation (3.4), we construct 
the likelihood function of the whole AR-DCC-GARCH system specified in Equations 
(3.1)-(3.9), and jointly estimate the AR parameters {𝜇𝑖, 𝜙𝑖 , 𝜏} , the DCC-GARCH 
parameters {ωi, 𝜅𝑖, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛼, 𝛽} and the shape parameters of the Student's t distribution with 
the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) procedure specified in Engle (2002). 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results from our model, explore the six variants of 
liquidity co-movements represented by the estimated conditional correlations, and discuss 
what these co-movements tell us about the transmission of liquidity shocks into and out 
of China's banking sector in the last five years, particularly during the two market events 
mentioned in Section 3.1.  
 
3.4.1 Model fitting and parameter estimates 
Before our model is estimated by the QML procedure, the five interest rate spreads 
are tested for stationarity by the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test. 
Neither tests support the existence of unit roots in the five series, so the levels of the rate 
spreads are directly used to fit the model. The QML results are tabulated in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Parameter estimates of the penta-variate AR(1)-DCC(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) system 
*: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level 
 
The empirical behaviors of the five rate spreads are well summarized by our model 
because most of the parameters are statistically significant at 5% level, including the serial 
correlation in conditional means, the volatility clustering in conditional variances and the 
fluctuations in conditional correlations. However, the negative parameter for the tax factor 
in the PFB-TB spread is puzzling. According to Section 3.3.3, the difference between the 
yields of PFB and TB contributed by the tax factor should be proportional to the TB yield. 
Given a positive tax rate, when the yield of TB increased, the tax related component in the 
PFB-TB spread should increase rather than decrease as suggested by the negative 𝜏. One 
 SHIBOR-TB IR-TB ER-TB CP-TB PFB-TB 
Conditional Mean: AR(1) 
𝝁𝒊 
      0.914***        1.052***       0.636***       1.764***       0.947*** 
(0.132) (0.133) (0.090) (0.464) (0.347) 
      
𝝓𝒊 
      0.888***       0.816***        0.735***       0.948***       0.944*** 
(0.033) (0.039) (0.055) (0.038) (0.027) 
      
𝝉 
    -0.224* 
    (0.128) 
Conditional Variance: GARCH(1, 1) 
𝝎𝒊 
0.006     0.024** 0.016     0.029** 0.002 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.002) 
      
𝜿𝒊 
      0.432***       0.526*** 0.125     0.756**     0.316** 
(0.098) (0.157) (0.084) (0.354) (0.143) 
      
𝝀𝒊 
      0.567***       0.473***       0.768***       0.243***       0.575*** 
(0.094) (0.084) (0.171) (0.079) (0.155) 
Conditional Correlation: DCC(1, 1) 
𝜶 
 
    0.033** 
(0.017) 
 
      0.945*** 
(0.038) 
𝜷 
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possible explanation for the negative 𝜏 is that higher yields in the credit market might have 
changed the composition of market participants in the credit market. According to Zhao 
(2015), the interest returns from PFBs are taxable for most financial institutions but tax-
free for fund management companies. When yields in the credit market increased, fund 
management companies might invest more in credit assets including PFBs. As a result, 
tax-free investors might constitute a larger proportion of PFB holders when yields were 
high, thereby lowering the average tax rate for PFB investors as well as the required 
premium of the PFB yield over the TB yield to offset the difference in tax. 
 
3.4.2 The liquidity co-movements measured by conditional correlations 
The two versions of Co-movement 1 and four versions of Co-movement 2 
represented by the estimated conditional correlations among our liquidity measures are 
visualized in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Before presenting the details, it is worth 
noting that each date marked on the figures is either a Friday or the last trading day in a 
week if it is not Friday, due to the fact that we use weekly averages of daily rates to 
estimate our model. 
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Figure 3.5. The co-movement of funding liquidity between the banking sector and stock traders 
(Source: authors) 
 
 
Figure 3.6. The co-movement between the funding liquidity of the banking sector and the market 
liquidity of major short-term debt securities in the interbank money market (Source: authors) 
 
The two sets of empirical correlations estimated by our DCC model are all positive over 
the whole sample period, ranging from around 0.1 at the low points to over 0.6 at the high 
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points. These fluctuating positive correlations suggest that the co-movements among our 
liquidity measures are substantial, and their strength varies much during the sample period, 
which is consistent with what we have expected. Meanwhile, from Figures 3.5 and 3.6, 
we notice a few distinct features11 in the patterns of the liquidity co-movements in close 
proximity to the timing of the two market events in focus. The most prominent feature in 
Co-movement 1 (i.e. the cross-market funding liquidity co-movement) is the peak of its 
strength around mid-2013, which is close to the timing of the “SHIBOR Shock” that took 
place in the week ending on June 21, 2013. There is a second peak in the strength of Co-
movement 1 based on IR (Co-movement 1b in Figure 3.5) around the end of 2014, which 
is in the middle of a period of drastic stock market movements. But the same peak is much 
less noticeable in Co-movement 1 based on CL (Co-movement 1a in Figure 3.5), and the 
gap between the two versions of Co-movement 1 seems to have widen significantly shortly 
before the peak and remain wider than it used to be ever since. The most prominent feature 
in Co-movement 2 (i.e. the co-movement of funding liquidity and market liquidity in the 
interbank market) is the spike in its strength around the end of 2014, which is captured by 
all the four versions of its empirical measures (see Figure 3.6). The timing of the spike 
coincides with the second peak in Co-movement 1b that we have suspected to be related 
to the stock market event. There is also a minor spike in the strength of Co-movement 2 
around the time of the “SHIBOR Shock”, but it is less standout compared to the first peak 
in Co-movement 1. In addition, the versions of Co-movement 2 based on PFB (Co-
                                                          
11 The distinct features in the liquidity co-movements discussed in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 are robust for different 
starting dates of our sample. For example, even if we estimate our model based on a shortened data set from 2012 
onward and recreate Figures 3.5 and 3.6, we will still see the same distinct features in the new figures.      
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movement 2a and 2c in Figure 3.6) and based on CP (Co-movements 2b and 2d in Figure 
3.6) alternate in strength before and after the “SHIBOR Shock”. These patterns and 
features have important implications on the transmission of liquidity shocks during the 
two market events in focus, which are discussed in Section 3.4.3.  
 
3.4.3 The transmission of liquidity shocks during the two market events 
By examining the liquidity co-movements captured by our empirical model in 
conjunction with the regulatory actions and policy changes surrounding the two market 
events (i.e. the rollercoaster ride in China's stock market between late-2014 and mid-2015 
and the “SHIBOR Shock” in June, 2013), we are able to better understand how the 
liquidity shocks related to the two market events were transmitted between China's 
banking sector and stock market via money market transactions. Our findings strongly 
suggest that liquidity shocks can be transmitted both ways between the banking sector and 
the stock market via the money market, and the transmission of shocks can be affected by 
various decisions of China's policy makers. Our narratives on the two events are presented 
separately in Section 3.4.3.1 and Section 3.4.3.2. 
 
3.4.3.1 The rollercoaster ride of China's stock market in 2014-2015 
The dramatic movements in China's stock market between late-2014 and mid-2015 
are illustrated by the CSI 300 Index in Figure 3.7. The two types of liquidity co-
movements corresponding to the period of Figure 3.7 are shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. 
The CSI 300 Index a major stock index in China that tracks the performance of 300 stocks 
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listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In this study, we 
specifically focus on the period between October, 2014, when the CSI 300 index rose 
above 2500 points for the first time since May, 2013, and June, 2015, when the index 
eventually reached above 5300 points but quickly collapsed back to the 3000-4000-point 
range. The patterns shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 clearly indicate that there was a 
stock-market-related liquidity shock affecting the banking sector via the money market in 
late-2014. Surprisingly, however, this shock seems to be related to the heating-up of the 
stock market rather than the collapse of the stock market.  
 
 
Figure 3.7. CSI 300 Index between July 2013 and April 2016 (Source: CEIC) 
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Figure 3.8. Co-movement 1 between July 2013 and April 2016. Shadow shows the different between 
the two versions (Source: authors) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Co-movement 2 between July 2013 and April 2016 (Source: authors) 
  
As we have discussed at the end of Section 3.2.2, strengthening Co-movement 1 
is a sign that the funding liquidity of traders in the interbank market is more closely tied 
to the funding liquidity of traders in the stock exchanges; strengthening Co-movement 2 
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is a sign that the funding liquidity in the banking sector is drying up; and the two co-
movements strengthening at the same time is a double confirmation that there is a liquidity 
shock being transmitted between the banking sector and the exchange market. From 
Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, we indeed observe that, between the week ended on November 
21, 2014 and the end of 2014, both Co-movement 1 and Co-movement 2 strengthened 
sharply while the CSI 300 Index skyrocketed from around 2600 points to around 3400 
points, which is a strong indication that a liquidity shock related to the stock market had 
affected the funding liquidity of the banking sector through the money market during that 
period. It is unlikely that the shock being transmitted was originated from a problem in 
the stock market, because otherwise the stock market would not have gone up so quickly 
at the same time. Instead, we conjecture that it was due to the funds in the exchange market 
being all tied-up in equity assets in the white-hot stock market, drying up the funds 
available for the further financing of stock traders. The funding illiquidity in the exchange 
market was transmitted into the interbank market when traders with dual-market access 
started bringing funds from the interbank market to the exchange market in response to 
the growing funding constraint in the exchange market, driving up Co-movement 1. As 
the funding condition in the interbank market tightened up, the banking sector might have 
been forced to recoup cash by liquidating some assets in interbank market, subsequently 
driving up Co-movement 2.  
 The patterns of the two co-movements and their correspondence with the timing 
of two major policy changes in October and November, 2014, respectively, suggest that 
the policy makers might have played an important role in the initiation and transmission 
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of the liquidity shock, because they made it easier for stock traders to access funds in the 
banking sector and provided incentive for them to borrow more. As mentioned in Section 
3.4.2, the gap between the versions of Co-movement 1 based on CL (1a) and based on IR 
(1b) widens notably since October, 2014 (see Figure 3.8). This shift in the mean difference 
between Co-movements 1a and 1b is also confirmed by a structural break testing and 
dating procedure specified in Bai and Perron (2003)12. The most likely contributor of this 
shift is a new rule issued by the PBOC on October 17, 201413, which allowed qualified 
non-financial corporations with at least 30 million yuan in net assets to access the 
interbank credit market. This policy change lowered the barriers between the two money 
markets and provided new funding opportunities for many commercial entities that 
previously only had access to funds in the exchange market. Given that these newcomers 
to the interbank market were more likely to borrow from the IR market rather than the 
unsecured CL market mainly reserved for high-credit financial institutions, the cross-
market flows of funds carried by them should mainly take place between the two repo 
markets. Thus, we expect the cross-market liquidity co-movement based on IR to 
strengthen relative to the cross-market liquidity co-movement based on CL following the 
new rule, which is indeed what we see in Figure 3.8. Meanwhile, the turning point of Co-
movements 1 and 2 at around November 21, 2014 is also not a coincidence. On November 
22, 2014, the PBOC lowered the benchmark interest rates in China for the first time since 
201214 , signaling major monetary easing and providing a strong incentive for more 
                                                          
12 The detailed structural break testing and dating procedure and results are available upon request from the author. 
13 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125963/2810732/index.html [in Chinese] 
14 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125440/125835/2892213/index.html [in Chinese] 
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borrowing. Following the rate change, the strength of Co-movements 1 and 2 immediately 
jumped up, reflecting tightening funding liquidity conditions in both money markets, 
while the upward movement in the CSI 300 Index started to accelerate. This is a substantial 
evidence that funds were leaving the banking sector via the interbank money market, being 
brought into the exchange market by entities with dual-market access, and being invested 
in the stock market. The much stronger reaction in Co-movement 1b compared to Co-
movement 1a (see Figure 3.8) is again an indication that the liquidity drain from the 
banking sector mainly took place in the IR market. In summary, our empirical results 
suggest that the policy change in October widened the money-market-based pathway for 
funds to flow between the banking sector and the exchange market, then the rate change 
in November triggered a major outflow of funds from the banking sector to the stock 
market via money market transactions.   
 The timing of the alleviation and dissipation of the liquidity stress, as implied by 
the sharp drops in the strength of the two liquidity co-movements at the end of 2014 and 
mid-2015 (see Figures 3.8 and 3.9), is also consistent with two policy decisions that aimed 
to release liquidity into the banking sector. During the week ending on December 26, 2014, 
the PBOC injected more than 300 billion yuan into the banking sector via Short-term 
Liquidity Operations (SLOs)15, which was a temporary relief for the funding illiquidity in 
the banking sector. On February 4, 2014, the PBOC lowered the reserve requirement ratio 
(RRR) for all banks for 0.5%, which was the first RRR adjustment since May, 201216 and 
                                                          
15 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125431/125478/2810439/index.html [in Chinese] 
16 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125434/125798/2875174/index.html [in Chinese] 
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a major relaxation of the funding constraint faced by the banking sector. This decision 
meant that an amount equal to 0.5% of all the renminbi deposits in China were freed up 
from the banking sector's mandatory reserves held by the central bank, which was a huge 
amount, considering the fact that the total renminbi deposit balance in China was over 100 
trillion yuan at the end of the first quarter in 2015 (PBOC, 2015d). The RRR change was 
followed by a sharp drop in the strength of both Co-movements 1 and 2, as well as a new 
round of rally in the stock market after a brief pull-back in January, suggesting that the 
liquidity conditions were quickly improving over the board.  
 The above narrative based on our empirical results and their coordination with 
market and policy events demonstrates that the two types of liquidity co-movements 
estimated by our model are capable of capturing the transmission and dissipation of 
liquidity shocks between China's banking sector and stock market via its segmented 
money market. During the rapid downfall of the stock market after its peak on June 12, 
2015 (see Figure 3.7), the liquidity co-movements displayed in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 again 
showed signs of illiquidity being transmitted between the two money markets and into the 
banking sector. Co-movement 1 strengthened immediately after June 12, 2014 and Co-
movement 2 followed suit a week later. However, the reactions of Co-movements 1 and 
2, particularly Co-movement 2, in the aftermath of the stock market collapse were much 
milder compared to the one-month period before the end of 2014, suggesting that the 
funding condition of the banking sector were not severely hampered by the violent 
downturn in the stock market. Based on this observation, we suspect that the retail 
investors restricted from borrowing in the two money markets and their financing 
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activities via OTC funding channels (refer to Figure 3.4) subjected to much less regulatory 
restrictions might have played a major role in the finale of the stock market rally before it 
ended in mid-June. In this case, the margin calls triggered by the freefalling equity prices 
would mainly affect the funding liquidity of traders not reliant on funds from the two 
money markets and their creditors not directly financed by the banking sector, thus 
diverting the transmission of liquidity shock away from the two public money markets 
and limiting how much shock could be captured by Co-movements 1 and 2. Our conjecture 
is supported by a report from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 17 issued 
in 2015, which stated that the number of new accounts in China's stock market opened in 
the first quarter of 2015 grew by over 400% quarter-over-quarter, and over 90% of these 
new accounts had a net asset value less than 500 thousand yuan, the legal minimum for 
margin accounts set by the CSRC. This report confirms that most of the new investors 
entering the stock market in early 2015 were indeed small retail investors that did not even 
have indirect access to funds in the two money markets via margins provided by their 
brokers, and would have to resort to OTC funding sources if they wanted to add leverage 
to their portfolios. Therefore, it is important to understand and monitor the transmission 
of liquidity shocks via OTC transactions outside of the two public money markets in order 
to prevent unexpected illiquidity contagion not reflected by the fluctuations in the public 
markets. A future study on this specific subject is needed once more data on China's OTC 
market becomes available.  
 
                                                          
17 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/tzzbh1/tbtzzjy/tbfxff/201504/t20150428_275686.html [in Chinese] 
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3.4.3.2 The “SHIBOR Shock” 
The “SHIBOR Shock” was a short-lived cash crunch in China's interbank money 
market that took place around mid-June in 2013 and reached its climax on June 20, 2013, 
when the SHIBOR rates shot up to record high levels. For example, the overnight SHIBOR 
jumped from 7.66% on June 19 to 13.44% on June 20, an unimaginable level for an 
overnight interbank rate. There was no official account for the event, but the media 
attributed it to the shortage of funds in the banking sector since early June and the PBOC 
temporarily withholding its liquidity provision to banks aiming to curb excess credit 
expansion (The Economist 2013a, 2013b). If this was indeed the case, then the liquidity 
shock was clearly originated from the banking sector, and would be reflected in 
strengthening Co-movement 2 (i.e. the co-movement between the funding liquidity and 
market liquidity in the interbank market) around the time of the “SHIBOR Shock”. 
Meanwhile, if this liquidity shock was transmitted from the banking sector to exchange-
based traders by money market transactions and eventually affected the liquidity in the 
stock market, Co-movement 1 (i.e. the cross-market funding liquidity co-movement) 
would also strengthen, and the stock market performance would be negatively affected 
around the time of the shock. All these features are confirmed by the patterns of the 
liquidity co-movements estimated by our model between May, 2013 and July, 2013 and 
the CSI 300 Index during the same period, which are displayed in Figures 3.10-3.13. 
Therefore, our empirical results provide strong evidences that a liquidity shock originated 
from the banking sector can be transmitted into the stock market via money market 
transactions. By further examining patterns of the liquidity co-movements surrounding the 
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event, we are able to not only provide a narrative on the spreading of the “SHIBOR Shock”, 
but also help verify some of the claims made by the media regarding what might have 
caused the liquidity shortage in the first place and how the banking sector and policy 
makers responded to the “SHIBOR Shock”.  
 
 
Figure 3.10. Co-movement 2 based on PFB between July 2012 and May 2014 (Source: authors) 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Co-movement 2 based on CP between July 2012 and May 2014 (Source: authors) 
2013-05-24
2013-06-21
2013-07-19
0
0.2
0.4
2012-07 2013-01 2013-07 2014-01
Co-movement 2 based on PFB
2a: Corr.(PFB-TB, SHIBOR-TB) 2c: Corr.(PFB-TB, IR-TB)
2013-05-24
2013-06-21
2013-07-19
0
0.2
0.4
2012-07 2012-12 2013-07 2014-01
Co-movement 2 based on CP
2b: Corr.(CP-TB, SHIBOR-TB) 2d: Corr.(CP-TB, IR-TB)
80 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Co-movement 1 between July 2012 and May 2014 (Source: authors) 
 
 
Figure 3.13. CSI 300 Index between July 2012 and May 2014 (Source: CEIC) 
 
The liquidity co-movements shown in Figures 3.10-3.12 seem to suggest that the 
funding condition in the banking sector started tightening rapidly since late May. Media 
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from a private PBOC meeting, the PBOC was alarmed by an apparent surge in lending in 
the first ten days in June, when the banks in China added almost 1 trillion yuan to their 
loan books, more than they typically lend in a whole month; and the PBOC concluded that 
some banks were expecting a fresh government stimulus and had “positioned themselves 
in advance” (The Economist, 2013b). The same article commented that the PBOC might 
have misread the banks' intentions, because 70% of in the 1 trillion yuan in new loans 
were short-term discounted bills intended to facilitate transactions between commercial 
enterprises, which were likely smuggled off balance-sheets at smaller banks and only 
resurfaced in early June after the regulator tightened up accounting at these banks. 
However, our results suggest that the PBOC's opinion had its own merit. Even if the new 
loans were mainly discounted bills, it appeared that the banks did stretched their balance-
sheets to finance these bills, which happened as early as in May. Our liquidity measure for 
CP is a good proxy for the liquidity of discounted bills, because they are both short-term 
corporate loans serving similar purposes. We separate the versions of Co-movement 2 
based on PFB (i.e. Co-movements 2a and 2c) and the versions based on CP (i.e. Co-
movement 2b and 2d) into two figures to show the discrepancies between them before the 
“SHIBOR Shock” and afterwards. By only looking at the CP versions Co-movement 2 
(see Figure 3.11), we may think that the funding constraint for the banking sector were 
suddenly relaxed in early May, 2013, because the strength of Co-movements 2b and 2d 
dropped to the lowest level since late 2011 at that time (refer to Figure 3.6). Yet, when we 
look at the PFB versions of Co-movement 2 for the same period (see Figure 3.10), we 
cannot find obvious clues for the major improvement of the funding condition in the 
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banking sector. This could happen if the banks continued to make it easier for companies 
to borrow short-term funds from them (i.e. improving liquidity of CPs) despite their 
funding liquidity were not improved (i.e. the liquidity of IRs and CLs not improved) and 
they did not want to buy more low-interest PFBs (i.e. the liquidity of PFBs not improved), 
hence the much weakened Co-movements 2b and 2d but relatively stable Co-movements 
2a and 2c in May, 2013. 
The liquidity co-movements also reveal that the transmission of the liquidity shock 
originated from the banking sector continued beyond the “SHIBOR Shock” and lasted 
well into July, 2013. The commonalities and differences in the patterns of different 
types/versions of the liquidity co-movements during and after the “SHIBOR Shock” 
provide strong indications that the banks changed their preferences and behaviors in 
response to the “SHIBOR Shock”. All four versions of Co-movement 2 strengthened 
sharply during the 2-3 weeks before June 21, 2013, but their movements started to differ 
significantly since the “SHIBOR Shock” (see Figures 3.10-3.12). If we only look at the 
Co-movement 2 based on PFB (see Figure 3.10), we are inclined to think that the 
“SHIBOR Shock” quickly dissipated and merely had a transient impact. However, the co-
movements shown in Figures 3.11 and 3.12 seem to tell a different story, in which the 
illiquidity in the banking sector continued to intensify and being transmitted into the 
exchange market until late July. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by a 
phenomenon called “flight to quality”, a term coined by Brunnermeier and Pederson 
(2009). In our case, flight to quality means that, when funding becomes scarce for the 
banks, they will favor safer and more liquid assets and will prioritize their cutback on 
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assets with higher volatility. It also means that the market liquidity of assets with higher 
volatility will be more sensitive to changes in the funding liquidity of the banks, i.e. the 
versions of Co-movement 2 based on assets with higher volatility would be stronger than 
the versions of Co-movement 2 based on assets with lower volatility. Although the 
“SHIBOR Shock” was temporarily eased when the PBOC provided liquidity support for 
selected banks by June 25, 201318, the liquidity pressure was still high in the banking 
sector, because there was no monetary stimulus in sight from the PBOC and the banks 
could no longer retain the mindset that PBOC would back them up whenever they were 
short of liquidity. This was the ideal setup for the flight to safety phenomenon to appear. 
Facing the persistent liquidity pressure, the banks preferred to hold more of their assets in 
PFBs rather than CPs, because the PFB was much less volatile than the CP (see Figure 
3.2) and risk-free. In this case, even if they no longer needed to fire-sale their assets, they 
might continue to sell their CP holdings while buying PFBs. Therefore, it is not surprising 
to see that the CP-based versions of Co-movement 2 (see Figure 3.11) had been stronger 
than the PFB-based versions of Co-movement 2 (see Figure 3.10) for close to six months 
after the “SHIBOR Shock”. We also notice from Figure 3.11 that the difference in strength 
between Co-movement 2b (i.e. the liquidity co-movement between CP and CL, the major 
funding source for large banks) and Co-movement 2d (i.e. the liquidity co-movement 
between CP and IR, the major funding source for small banks) was substantially wider 
during the five months after the “SHIBOR Shock” than the rest of the sample period. We 
consider it an indication that the flight to safety phenomenon was more pronounced for 
                                                          
18 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2868130/index.html [in Chinese] 
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small banks than large banks, possibly due to CPs and other short-term corporate loans 
having more weights in the assets of small banks than large banks prior to the “SHIBOR 
Shock”. Similar to the versions of Co-movement 2 based on CP, the strength of Co-
movement 1 continued to rise after the “SHIBOR Shock” until it reached its highest point 
in history in mid-July (see Figure 3.12). We suspect it was driven by the banks pulling 
back the funds they previously supplied to traders with dual-market access, including 
institutional investors in the stock market, in order to cope with the liquidity pressure, 
because the CSI 300 Index had been dropping since early June until reaching its lowest 
point in 2013 in mid-July, some 15% lower than the beginning of June (see Figure 3.13). 
These fund movements can be attributed to the flight-to-safety phenomenon as well, 
because the banks may have preferred to hold more cash and safe assets such as PFBs and 
TBs in the interbank market than financing the traders with exposure to the riskier and 
more volatile exchange market. In summary, by assessing the estimated liquidity co-
movements before, during and after the “SHIBOR Shock”, we are not only able to verify 
the transmission of liquidity shock from the banking sector to the stock market via money 
market transactions, but also able to provide important insights on the involvement of the 
policy makers in the build-up of this event and the reactions of the banking sector in the 
aftermath of this event. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we conduct the first empirical examination of the transmission paths 
for liquidity shocks created by money-market-based financing and trading activities in 
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China. We find strong evidences that liquidity shocks can indeed be transmitted back and 
forth between China's banking sector and a part of the financial system that it does not 
have direct access to, such as the stock market, via the money market in China, despite the 
regulatory restrictions imposed on the banks and the segmentation existed in China's 
money market. We are able to unveil these evidences by first creating an array of empirical 
measures for the funding liquidity of the banking sector in the interbank money market, 
the funding liquidity of stock traders in the exchange-based money market, as well as the 
market liquidity of short-term credit assets, then modelling the co-movements among them 
with a multivariate DCC-GARCH model. The results from our empirical model enable us 
to better understand how liquidity shocks were transmitted across different parts of China's 
financial system during the rollercoaster ride of China's stock market between late-2014 
and mid-2015 and the “SHIBOR Shock” in mid-2013. They also provide us important 
insights on the crucial roles played by China's banking sector and policy makers during 
these two events.  
What we have found in this study can be regarded as both a testimony for the 
improved interconnectivity between China's interbank market and exchange market, and 
a warning sign for the potential risk associated with it. It can serve as a strong reminder 
for China's policy makers and market participants that money market transactions are 
capable of allowing a liquidity shock to circumvent various regulatory restrictions and 
segmentations in China's financial system and result in a widespread illiquidity contagion, 
thus presenting a major threat to the overall stability of China's financial system. Therefore, 
it is important for the policy makers and regulators in China to closely monitor how funds 
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are flowing through the two money markets in China to prevent a system-wide liquidity 
crisis like the one that took place in the U.S. in 2007. It is also important for the entities 
engaged in money market transactions in China, particularly the banking sector, to prepare 
for the unexpected illiquidity contagion associated with trading and financing in the 
money market.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE 
RENMINBI INTERBANK INTEREST RATES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON 
THE TRILEMMA CHALLENGE FOR CHINA’S MONETARY AUTHORITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The terms “onshore” and “offshore” are seldom associated with a major currency, 
except for the Chinese renminbi. The onshore renminbi (CNY) refers to the renminbi 
circulating within the border of Mainland China while the offshore renminbi (CNH) refers 
to the renminbi circulating outside the border of Mainland China. The distinction between 
the two highlights the segmentation between the markets of CNY and CNH and the tight 
control on cross-border flows of the renminbi imposed by China’s financial regulators. In 
recent years, the internationalization of the renminbi and its emergence as a major world 
currency has facilitated growing research interest on the CNH and its interaction with the 
CNY. However, the current literature on CNH is still rather limited and largely centers on 
the aspect of its exchange rate. For example, Funke et al. (2015) assess the factors 
contributing to the CNH-CNY pricing differential based on their exchange rates with the 
U.S. dollar (USD). The lack of interest rate aspect in the literature of CNH could be due 
to the absence of a benchmark interest rate for the CNH money market before 2013. With 
the launch of CNH HIBOR in June 2013 by the Treasury Markets Association (TMA) of 
Hong Kong and over three years of data accumulation since then, it is finally feasible for 
us to empirically examine the CNH-CNY interaction from the perspective of their market 
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interest rates and provide previously unattainable insights on the decision-making of 
China’s monetary policy maker based on the empirically findings. This new possibility 
motivates the current study.  
 So why are we interested in the interaction between the market interest rates of the 
CNH and the CNY, specifically the interaction between their short-term interbank interest 
rates? The main reason is that this interaction can shed light on how China’s monetary 
policymakers deal with the famous “impossible trinity” or “trilemma” problem first 
elaborated by Mundell (1963). The “trilemma” refers to a fundamental challenge in 
monetary policymaking, which states that exchange rate stability, financial market 
openness, and monetary policy autonomy cannot be achieved simultaneously in an open 
economy, even though all these three properties are highly attractive operational goals for 
monetary authorities around the world. After China’s monetary policymakers started 
liberalizing the exchange rate of the renminbi, gradually opening up the domestic financial 
market and modernizing their monetary instruments a few years back, they would 
inevitably face the trilemma challenge in the process. According to Kawai and Liu (2015), 
unlike many countries that choose to achieve two of the three properties while 
compromising the third one, China adopts an intermediate combination of the three 
properties and chooses the level of attainment of each of these properties according to 
their policy objectives. Based on this observation, we suspect that the monetary authority 
in China may have been actively adjusting how it approaches the trilemma amid varying 
market conditions and changing policy priorities over the years instead of following a 
single regime. The newly available benchmark interbank interest rate data for the CNH 
89 
 
allows us to empirically examine how the PBOC prioritized among the three aspects of 
the trilemma overtime.  
 There are three ways the CNH interbank interest rate can inform us about how the 
PBOC approaches the trilemma. First, the CNH-CNY interest rate spread is a direct 
indicator for the strength of capital controls in China, a major factor that hinders the 
openness of China’s financial market. Given the fact that the CNY and the CNH are 
essentially the same currency separated by the border, a large difference between the 
interest rates of CNY and CNH cannot sustain if the cross-border flows of the renminbi 
currency is unrestricted, because any substantial divergence between the two interest rates 
will be offset by arbitrage activities. Therefore, a persistent gap between the two interest 
rates that cannot be explained by transaction costs or the fundamental differences between 
the two markets is a strong indication for capital controls in effect. Any major shift in the 
size of the gap can be viewed as a signal for tightened or loosened capital controls. 
Secondly, the interactions between the CNY and the CNH interbank interest rates can tell 
us whether or not the PBOC’s policymaking is affected by the decisions of foreign central 
banks. Short-term interbank interest rates such as Fed Funds rate, Libor, Euribor and Eonia 
play a key role in the monetary transmission of major economies, because they are 
frequently employed by central banks as operational targets while serving as the 
benchmarks for the interest rates of loans and other credit instruments. Although the major 
benchmark rates in the CNY interbank money market, such as the SHIBOR and interbank 
repo rate, are not explicitly targeted by the PBOC, they are found to be significantly 
reactive to the PBOC’s monetary policy instruments (See Porter and Xu, 2009; He and 
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Wang, 2012). In comparison, the CNH interbank money market is a freely-traded money 
market beyond the jurisdiction of the PBOC and is directly exposed to the impact of 
monetary policy actions by foreign central banks. Suppose we consider the CNY interbank 
interest rate as a receptor for the monetary policy shocks from PBOC and the CNH 
interbank interest rate as a receptor for foreign monetary shocks. We can then assess the 
status of China’s monetary policy autonomy by examining the interaction between the two 
interest rates. For a given period, if the CNH interbank interest rate is found to be driving 
the CNY interbank interest rate but not the other way around, it is a strong evidence that 
China does not maintain monetary autonomy during that period. Lastly, the interaction 
between the CNH-CNY interest rate spread and the exchange rate volatility of CNH can 
reflect if the PBOC uses capital controls to stabilize the exchange rate of renminbi. Unlike 
the fluctuation of the CNY exchange rate which is constrained by the PBOC, the 
fluctuation of the CNH exchange rate is dictated by market forces. One way for the PBOC 
to stabilize the exchange rate of the renminbi in the international market is by instituting 
capital controls. As mentioned earlier, the tightness of the capital controls on renminbi can 
be signaled by the CNH-CNY interest rate spread. If we find that the exchange rate 
volatility drives the CNH-CNY interest rate spread for a given period, it is a strong 
evidence that the PBOC sacrifices financial market openness in favor of exchange rate 
stability.  
 Based on the assessment above, we develop an empirical approach in this paper to 
unveil the statuses of the three components of the monetary policy trilemma in China and 
explore how the PBOC alters its handling of the trilemma overtime. Before getting into 
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the details of our analysis, we first provide a background on the CNY and CNH interbank 
money markets in Section 4.2. We then present our methodology, our data and the 
theoretical basis for our empirical analysis in Section 4.3, and discuss our empirical results 
in Section 4.4. In the end, we summarize our major findings and their policy implications 
in Section 4.5.    
 
4.2 Background 
The CNY interbank money market was established in the 1990s when China’s 
monetary authority started reforming the country’s financial system and allowing banks 
and other financial institutions to lend to each other in a public marketplace. The CNY 
interbank market is the first market in China where the interest rates are determined by 
market transactions instead of being specified by the government. Currently, there are two 
major types of reference interest rates for CNY interbank market transactions: the 
SHIBOR and the interbank repo fixing rate. The SHIBOR is a type of unsecured interbank 
interest rates with maturities ranging from overnight to a year. The daily published 
SHIBOR rates with different maturities are determined by averaging the quotes from a 
board of domestic banks and domestic branches of foreign banks in a similar manner like 
the Libor. The interbank repo fixing rate is a type of secured interbank interest rates 
determined by averaging the rates of actual repo transactions during a specific time 
window in each trading day with additional adjustments for trading days without 
significant number of actual transactions. Although interbank repo transactions come in 
different maturities, the fixing rates are published only for three maturities: overnight, 7-
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day, and 14-day. With the exception of the tightly regulated deposit and loan interest rates, 
the interest rates in China are now largely determined by market forces after two decades 
of gradual interest rate liberalization. Most of the newly issued bonds in China are priced 
using either the SHIBOR or interbank repo fixing rate as benchmarks.  
 Compared to the CNY interbank money market, the wholesale money market for 
the CNH has a much shorter history and is still in its early stage of development. The 
renminbi traditionally did not have a significant presence outside of China until recent 
years when the policymakers in China started opening up the country’s financial market 
and promoting the international use of the renminbi with the help of China’s booming 
economy and growing external linkages. Since the early 2010s, the trading of the renminbi 
has increasingly taken place in the foreign exchange (FX) markets at offshore locations, 
with Hong Kong, London, Singapore and New York being the top centers (Funke et al., 
2015). In merely six years since April 2010, the renminbi has risen from the eighteenth 
most traded currencies in the world to the current eighth spot (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010, 2016). During the same period, the renminbi has also become a major 
payment currency for international transactions. It was only the seventeenth most used 
international payment currency in November 2011, but now it is the sixth (SWIFT, 2011, 
2016). As the quantity of the renminbi at offshore locations grew along with the rapid 
expanding CNH FX trading and payment activities, it was inevitable that more and more 
CNH lending and borrowing activities would take place and a formal money market and 
benchmark interest for the CNH would be needed.  On June 24, 2013, the CNH Hong 
Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) was formally introduced by the Hong Kong TMA, 
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marking the establishment of a formal CNH interbank money market in Hong Kong, the 
leading hub for CNH trading and deposits.  
The relationship between the CNY and the CNH interbank money markets is 
conceptually similar to the relationship between the Fed Funds market and the Eurodollar 
market. The CNY interbank money market, like the Fed Funds market, lies within the 
border of its issuing country and are subjected to the financial regulations and monetary 
policy actions of the country, while the CNH interbank money market, like the Eurodollar 
market, hosts the currency circulating outside of its issuing country and is largely beyond 
the control of the country’s financial regulators and monetary authority. The onshore 
interbank market often occupies a key position in a country’s financial system, because it 
is not only the venue where financial institutions borrow short-term funds from each other 
in order to maintain liquid operation and fulfill their government-mandated capital/reserve 
requirements, but also a platform where the country’s central bank intervenes market 
interest rates. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve manages the U.S. interest rates by 
targeting the Fed Funds rate, the shortest end of the yield curve, and using OMOs to 
maintain the Fed Funds effective rate around the target level. The PBOC also conduct 
OMOs via the CNY interbank money market and use various policy instruments to 
influence the SHIBOR and the interbank repo fixing rates, despite not targeting the 
interbank interest rates explicitly. Unlike the onshore interbank markets that exist in many 
countries, active offshore money markets only exist for currencies that have substantial 
presence outside of their countries of origin, such as the USD. The offshore USD, 
including the USD outside of Europe, is collectively referred to as Eurodollar due to 
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historical reasons. The most important hub for Eurodollar is the London interbank money 
market, where the benchmark interest rate for Eurodollar, Libor, is determined. Given the 
fact that Hong Kong hosts the first formal CNH interbank money market, the Hong Kong 
interbank market for the CNH can be considered having a similar role as the London 
interbank market for the Eurodollar. Under this assumption, the CNH HIBOR can be 
viewed as the Libor equivalent for the renminbi.  
 Despite the analogy between the CNY/CNH interbank money markets for the 
renminbi and the Fed Funds/Eurodollar money markets for the USD, the interaction 
between the benchmark interest rates for CNY (i.e. the SHIBOR and the interbank repo 
fixing rates) and the benchmark interest rate for CNH, the CNH HIBOR, does not at all 
resemble the interaction between the Fed Funds rate and the USD Libor. Historically, the 
USD Libor almost always closely tracks the Fed Funds effective rate. From Figure 4.1, 
we can see that USD Libor rates with short maturities have been consistently moving in 
close proximity with the Fed Funds rate over the last 15 years, except during the 2007 U.S. 
subprime crisis. In comparison, throughout the entire history of the CNH HIBOR, its 
relationship with the CNY SHIBOR or repo rates seems to have gone through several 
major shifts (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). There were times when the CNH HIBOR roughly 
fluctuated around the CNY interbank interest rates (e.g. between mid-2014 to mid-2015 
and during the second quarter of 2016). There were also times when the interest rates of 
CNH and CNY seemed completely irrelevant and differed by astronomical amounts (e.g. 
during January 2016 and during January 2017). The massive gaps up to a few thousand 
basis points (bps) between the interest rates of CNH and CNY during those periods dwarf 
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the maximum difference between Libor and Fed Funds rate during the subprime crisis, 
even though there has not been any major financial crises in either Hong Kong or Mainland 
China since the introduction of the CNH HIBOR. This puzzling observation is difficult to 
be explained by market forces alone. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Fed funds effective rate vs. the USD Libor rates with overnight and 1-week maturities 
(Source: FRED) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. CNY SHIBOR and repo fixing rates vs. CNH HIBOR of overnight maturity (Source: 
CEIC) 
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Figure 4.3. CNY SHIBOR and repo fixing rates vs. CNH HIBOR of 1-week maturity (Source: 
CEIC) 
 
The stark contrast between the onshore-offshore interest rate interactions of the 
renminbi and the USD is a strong reminder for the fundamental differences between the 
renminbi and the USD money markets, despite their superficial similarities. These 
differences are directly tied to the trilemma mentioned in Section 4.1. The USD is a fully 
convertible currency with unrestricted cross-border mobility between the U.S. market and 
the offshore markets. It means that any significant exchange rate and interest rate 
divergence for the USD at onshore and offshore locations can be easily offset by arbitrage, 
unless there are major financial crises making the financial institutions unable or unwilling 
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exchange rate controls and capital controls. The current exchange rate scheme for the CNY 
is a managed floating system in reference to a basket of currencies. The PBOC specifies 
the daily central parity exchange rates for the CNY based on the basket and enforces a 
daily trading band for the CNY/USD exchange rate in regards to its central parity rate, 
which was set to +/- 1% in 2010 and widened to +/- 2% since March, 2014 (Funke et al., 
2015). Besides the exchange rate controls, there is also a daily limit for the CNY holders 
on how much they can convert their CNY into foreign currencies as well as a limit on how 
much renminbi cash they can bring out of Mainland China and turn into the CNH. Unlike 
the CNY, the CNH is fully convertible at offshore locations with market-determined 
exchange rates. But once the CNY becomes the CNH, it will be difficult for it to be turned 
back into the CNY, because there are only a few restrictive channels for the CNH holders 
to bring their renminbi back to the domestic financial markets in China. The obvious 
segmentation between the onshore and offshore markets of the renminbi implies that the 
discrepancies between the exchange rates or interest rates of the CNY and the CNH do 
not always mean arbitrage opportunities. It all depends how the PBOC enforces the capital 
controls and prioritize its policy objectives. For example, if the PBOC prioritize the 
objective of renminbi internationalization, it may opt for less capital controls while 
maintaining a relatively stable renminbi exchange rate in order to make the renminbi more 
attractive in the international market, which in turn means that it has to compromise on 
monetary policy autonomy. If instead the PBOC intends to focus on the domestic 
monetary objectives while limiting the interference from the international market, it may 
have to enforce more capital controls in order to avoid excess fluctuation of the renminbi 
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exchange rates. As mentioned in Section 4.1, by empirically examining the interactions 
between the short-term interbank interest rates of the CNY and the CNH, we can learn 
about how the PBOC prioritizes its policy objectives amid the trilemma.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
In this section, we extend on the framework we establish in Section 4.1 and present 
the details of the empirical methods and model settings being used to assess each of the 
three components of the monetary trilemma in China based on the interaction of the CNY 
and CNH interbank interest rates. We then describe the data we use to conduct our analysis 
after specifying our empirical approach in Sections 4.3.1-4.3.3. 
 
4.3.1 Assessing the strength of capital controls based on the two interest rates 
Capital control is a major monetary measure that has adverse impact on a country’s 
financial market openness. The efficacy of capital controls in China was previously 
examined by Ma and McCauley (2008) based on the yield gap between the onshore and 
offshore renminbi and a few other measures. At the time of their study, the offshore 
renminbi was yet to be assigned its formal abbreviation CNH, the formal offshore 
renminbi money market was yet to be formed, and the interest rate benchmark for the 
offshore renminbi was nonexistent. In order to measure the difference between the onshore 
and offshore renminbi interest rates, Ma and McCauley (2008) calculated the covered-
interest-parity-(CIP)-implied offshore renminbi interest rate using the offshore renminbi 
non-deliverable forward (NDF) exchange rate and the USD Libor. They found that the 
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capital controls in China was able to consistently maintain an economically significant 
yield gap between the onshore and offshore renminbi. They also found that the yield gap 
might have been shifted multiple times by the PBOC’s policy changes.  
Following Ma and McCauley’s (2008) approach, we use the interest rate spread 
between the CNY and the CNH as the main indicator for China’s capital controls in this 
study. Instead of having to estimate the offshore renminbi interest rate based on the CIP, 
we now enjoy the convenience of having the market-determined benchmark interest rates 
for both the CNY and the CNH interbank money markets, allowing us to explore the gap 
between them directly. As shown in Section 4.2, a persistent CNH-CNY interest rate 
spread still exist as of early 2017, suggesting that impact of capital controls in China still 
remains. Meanwhile, the strength of capital controls in China as indicated by the CNH-
CNY interest rate spread seems to have gone through several major shifts over the last 3-
4 years. The first part of our empirical analysis is dedicated to pinpointing the timing of 
these shifts and identifying the policy factors that may have contributed to these shifts. 
Our approach here is to first calculate the CNH-CNY interest rate spread based on a pair 
of onshore/offshore interest rates with comparable risk characteristics and maturity, then 
conduct a structural break test on the interest rate spread to determine the number and the 
timing of significant shifts in its mean. Our approach relies on the following three 
assumptions: the CNH-CNY interest rate spread fluctuates around a zero mean with finite 
variances if capital controls are nonexistent or nonbinding; binding capital controls move 
the mean interest rate spread away from zero and may also alter the variance of the interest 
rate spread at the same time; and policy change related to capital control may result in a 
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sudden shift in the mean of the interest rate spread. Based on these assumptions, we can 
then examine the shifts in the mean of the CNH-CNY interest rate spread using the 
structural break testing and dating procedures specified in Bai and Perron (2003). The 
reason why we choose Bai and Perron’s (2003) method is because it is capable of 
simultaneously detecting and dating multiple break points in a linear model under fairly 
loose assumptions. Their procedure does not require the error variance of the linear model 
to be constant, provided the breaks in the variance occur at the same dates as the breaks in 
the parameters of the model, in our case, the mean of the interest rate spread. The model 
to be tested for structural breaks is specified as the following: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡         𝑖 = 1, 2, … , N + 1; 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , T                                                                      (4.1) 
where 𝑖 is the number of the periods separated by the N structural breaks, 𝑆𝑡 = 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡 −
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 is the CNH-CNY interest rate spread, 𝐶𝑖 is the mean of the interest rate spread for 
period 𝑖, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the random disturbance for period 𝑖 and time 𝑡 with mean zero and 
finite variance.  
Using the methods provided by Bai and Perron (2003), we can first test for the 
existence of multiple structural breaks against the hypothesis of no structural breaks in the 
above model, then simultaneously determine the optimal number of break points and the 
break dates. Since the mean of the interest rate spread 𝐶𝑖 is the only parameter in the model, 
each structural break in the model represents a shift in the mean of the interest rate spread. 
Based on the break dates, we can divide our data into subsamples and examine if the mean 
CNH-CNY interest rate spread is significantly different from zero in each subsample. In 
the meantime, we can examine if there were policy changes related to capital controls that 
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took place around the break dates and verify if the directions of the shifts in the mean 
interest rate spread at the structural breaks were consistent with the policy changes.  
 
4.3.2 Assessing the status of monetary policy autonomy based on the two interest rates 
Suppose the analysis specified in Section 4.3.1 reveals that the strength of the 
capital controls in China has experienced major shifts in the recent history and the shifts 
were evidently related to certain policy changes by the PBOC. We want next to find out 
is whether or not the monetary policy autonomy in China was better maintained during 
the periods with tighter capital controls than the periods with looser capital controls. As 
mentioned in Section 4.1, we consider the CNY interbank interest rate as the receptor for 
domestic monetary policy shocks and the CNH interbank interest rate as the receptor for 
foreign monetary policy shocks. Although maintaining a difference between the CNY and 
the CNH interest rates is already an indication for monetary autonomy, we want to take a 
step further to explore if one of the two interests is the driver for the other in the different 
periods separated by structural breaks. Specifically, we want to examine the causal 
relationship between the two interest rates based on the Granger causality concept first 
proposed by Granger (1969). This concept has been employed by numerous studies, such 
as Karfakis and Moschos (1990), Katsimbris and Miller (1993), Hassapis, Pittis and 
Prodromidis (1999) and Wang, Yang and Li (2007), to examine the interest rate linkages 
across international money markets. Most of these studies examine the pairwise Granger 
causal relationships among the interest rates of European Monetary System (EMS) 
members, as well as between the interest rates of EMS members and the other major 
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economies in the world. They inspire us to conduct a similar study between the CNY and 
the CNH interest rates.  
 In this study, we largely follow the framework provided by Granger, Huang and 
Yang (2000) to assess the Granger causality between the CNY and the CNH interest rates. 
Although their study focuses on the bivariate causality between the stock prices and the 
exchange rates instead of between two interest rates, they specifically address the issue of 
applying Granger causality tests to the time series that are prone to the issues of unit root, 
cointegration, and structural breaks, which are exactly the potential issues we may 
encounter in our data. We adopt the formulation of the Granger causality tests directly 
from Granger, Huang and Yang (2000), but we handle structural break, unit root and 
cointegration differently from their approach. Instead of dealing with the structural breaks 
in the Granger causality tests, we adopt the break dates directly from the results of the 
analysis specified in Section 4.3.1. We intend to perform a Granger causality test for each 
of periods separated by the structural breaks. But before doing so, we need to verify if unit 
roots and cointegration exist in our data, because the formulation of the interest rate 
models being tested for Granger causality depends on the presence of unit root and 
cointegration. The Granger causality test for each period is based on a bivariate vector 
autoregression (VAR) model. As shown by Granger (1988), the existence of cointegration 
substantially affects the results of Granger causality tests. To address this issue, we first 
perform unit root tests on the two interest rate series for each period. In the periods when 
the interest rates are stationary, we do not need to worry about cointegration and can 
conduct a Granger causality test to a VAR model based on the levels of the interest rates. 
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If unit root presents in a specific period, the data in that period is then further tested for 
cointegration using the Johansen procedure developed by Johansen (1991). In the case that 
both interest rates are I(1) but not cointegrated, the VAR model for that period is specified 
based on the first-difference series. In the case that cointegration exists between the two 
interest rates, an error correction term is then added to the VAR model according to 
Granger, Huang and Yang (2000). The three variants of bivariate VAR models being used 
in our Granger causality tests19 are specified as the following: 
(a) If the two interest rates are both stationary in period 𝑖: 
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼1,𝑖,𝑗𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑖,𝑗𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡                                           (4.2)    
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑗𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑗𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡                                           (4.3) 
(b) If the two interest rates are I(1) but not cointegrated in period 𝑖: 
Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼1,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡                                  (4.4)    
Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡                                  (4.5) 
(c) If the two interest rates are I(1) and cointegrated in period 𝑖: 
Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑖 + 𝛿1,𝑖(𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛼1,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛼2,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡        (4.6)    
Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛿2,𝑖(𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑗Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡        (4.7) 
The optimal number of lags 𝑘 for the interest rate model in each period 𝑖 is determined by 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). For the periods that match Scenarios (a) or (b), 
failing to reject the 𝐻0: 𝛼2,𝑖,1 = 𝛼2,𝑖,2 = ⋯ = 𝛼2,𝑖,𝑘 = 0  implies the CNH interbank 
interest rate does not Granger cause the CNY interbank interest rate in period 𝑖; and failing 
                                                          
19 The testing procedure in this study follows the standard type of Granger causality test. Alternative testing 
procedures involving out of sample forecasting have been proposed but are no often used (See Granger, 1980).    
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to reject the 𝐻0: 𝛽1,𝑖,1 = 𝛽1,𝑖,2 = ⋯ = 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑘 = 0 implies that the CNY interbank interest 
rate does not Granger cause the CNH interbank interest rate. For the periods that match 
Scenario (c), failing to reject the 𝐻0: 𝛼2,𝑖,1 = 𝛼2,𝑖,2 = ⋯ = 𝛼2,𝑖,𝑘 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿1,𝑖 = 0 
implies the CNH interbank interest rate does not Granger cause the CNY interbank interest 
rate in period 𝑖; and failing to reject the 𝐻0: 𝛽1,𝑖,1 = 𝛽1,𝑖,2 = ⋯ = 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑘 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 δ2,i = 0 
implies that the CNY interbank interest rate does not Granger cause the CNH interbank 
interest rate.  
 Given the results from the Granger causality tests, we can then assess the status of 
monetary policy autonomy in China throughout the different periods. If the CNH interest 
rate does not Granger cause the CNY interest rate in a specific period, we consider 
monetary policy autonomy being well-maintained in that period. If for the same period, 
we also find that CNY interest rate Granger causes the CNH interest rate, it is an evidence 
that China’s monetary authority has the ability to influence the renminbi interest rates 
abroad even with the segmentation between the domestic and international markets. We 
are particularly interested in the status of monetary policy autonomy during the periods 
when the capital controls are loose. The trilemma implies that in order to maintain a higher 
degree of financial market openness, the monetary authority needs to compromise either 
monetary policy autonomy or exchange rate stability. By examining the status of monetary 
policy autonomy during the periods when capital controls are loose, we are able to infer if 
China’s monetary authority gives up some degrees monetary policy autonomy in exchange 
for more financial market openness. If this is not the case according to the Granger test 
results, then we suspect that it is exchange rate stability that is being compromised among 
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the three aspects of the trilemma. The methods we employ to examine the connection 
between the exchange rate stability and capital controls are specified in Section 4.3.3.    
 
4.3.3 Assessing the PBOC’s policy stance on exchange rate stability based on the two 
interest rates  
In Section 4.3.1, we have already established the connection between the CNH-
CNY interest rate spread and the capital controls on the renminbi in China. Suppose we 
use the CNH-CNY interest rate spread as a proxy for the strength of capital controls on 
the renminbi. By examining the interaction between the CNH-CNY interest rate spread 
and the exchange rate volatility of the renminbi, we can verify if tightening capital controls 
has been used by the PBOC as a countermeasure against increasing fluctuation in the 
renminbi exchange rate. The method we use to perform this examination is again based 
on the concept of Granger causality, and the testing strategies are directly borrowed from 
Section 4.3.2. If the exchange rate volatility is found to Granger cause the interest rate 
spread, and the causality is positive, i.e. higher exchange rate volatility leads to wider 
interest rate spread, it is an indication that capital controls maybe have been strengthened 
in response to excess exchange rate volatility. If instead the exchange rate volatility does 
not Granger cause the interest rate spread, but the interest rate spread Granger cause the 
exchange rate volatility, it could imply two different scenarios depending on the sign of 
the Granger causality from the interest rate spread to the exchange rate volatility. Positive 
causality implies that stronger capital controls may have been the reason for higher 
exchange rate volatility rather than the policymakers’ response to it. Negative causality 
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implies that imposing more capital controls may have been effective in curbing the 
exchange rate volatility.  
Before conducting the Granger causality tests, we need to specify an empirical 
measure for the exchange rate volatility of the renminbi to pair with the CNH-CNY 
interest rate spread. As mentioned earlier, there are two types of renminbi exchange rates, 
the onshore rates and the offshore rates. In this study, the volatility of the offshore 
CNH/USD exchange rate is chosen instead of the onshore CNY/USD exchange rate, 
because the volatility of the offshore exchange rate is more representative of the varying 
supply and demand of the renminbi in the international FX market, compared to the 
volatility of the onshore exchange rate that is artificially limited by the daily trading band 
set by the PBOC (see Section 4.2). Inspired by the fact that the PBOC enforces a 
percentage-based daily trading band to cap the daily fluctuation of the CNY exchange 
rates, we define our daily volatility measure of the CNH/USD exchange rate as the 
absolute value of the daily percentage change of the CNH/USD exchange rate. Suppose 
𝐸𝑡  is the nominal CNH/USD exchange rate at the end of trading day 𝑡. Our volatility 
measure is calculated as 𝑣𝑡 = |100 ∗ (𝐸𝑡/𝐸𝑡−1  − 1)| . The policy objective of 
maintaining exchange rate stability can then be quantified as to minimize 𝑣𝑡. To assess the 
Granger causal relationships between the interest rate spread and the exchange rate 
volatility, we replace the 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡  (or its first-difference Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 ) and 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡  (or its first-
difference Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡) in Equations (4.2)-(4.7) with the interest rate spread 𝑆𝑡 (or its first-
difference Δ𝑆𝑡) and the exchange rate volatility 𝑣𝑡 (or its first-difference Δ𝑣𝑡) , and then 
follow the same procedures as specified in Section 4.3.2.    
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4.3.4 The data 
The data required to conduct the analyses specified in Section 4.3.1 includes the 
daily CNY and CNH interbank interest rates as well as the daily CNH/USD exchange rate. 
As mentioned earlier, there are two major types of CNY interbank interest rate 
benchmarks, the SHIBOR and the interbank repo fixing rates. There are limitations with 
using either of the two in the current study, because neither of them is fully comparable to 
the CNH HIBOR, our only choice available for the CNH interbank interest rate. By 
definition, the SHIBOR is the closest counterpart to the CNH HIBOR in the CNY money 
market, because they are both determined by averaging the quotes from a board of selected 
contributing banks in a fixed daily quotation window rather than the rates from actual 
transactions. However, between the August 1, 2014 and December 30, 2016, the SHIBOR 
had been published daily at 9:30am, which was close to two hours ahead of the daily 
publication time of CNH HIBOR at 11:15am. Therefore, the SHIBOR and the CNH 
HIBOR on the same date do not necessarily reflect the same set of market information. 
Meanwhile, the SHIBOR and the CNY HIBOR have different day-count conventions. The 
SHIBOR is annualized based on the day-count convention of 360 days per year, while the 
CNH HIBOR is annualized based on the day-count convention of 365 days per year. 
Compared to the SHIBOR, the CNY interbank repo fixing rate has two major advantages. 
First, the CNY interbank repo fixing rate has been published daily at 11:30am throughout 
the entire history of the CNH HIBOR, which is only 15 minutes apart from the daily 
publication time of the CNH HIBOR. Therefore, the spread between the two rates is less 
susceptible to market shocks that take place during the period between the publication 
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times of the two interest rates. Secondly, the CNY interbank repo fixing rate has the same 
day-count convention as the CNH HIBOR, thus can be directly compared to the CNH 
HIBOR without conversion. However, there is a potential issue with choosing the CNY 
interbank repo fixing rate as the CNY interest rate to be used in our study. As mentioned 
earlier, the repo interest rate is a type of collateralized interest rate while the SHIBOR and 
the CNH HIBOR are both credit-based unsecured rates. Even in absence of capital controls, 
the credit risk premium in the CNH HIBOR alone could lead to a difference between the 
CNY repo fixing rate and the CNH HIBOR. Yet, given the fact that there has not been a 
major bank solvency issue in Mainland China or Hong Kong since the time when the CNH 
HIBOR was introduced, the credit risk premium in the CNH HIBOR is likely very small, 
especially in short maturities. Meanwhile, switching to the SHIBOR will not make much 
difference, because the gap between the SHIBOR and the interbank repo fixing rate is 
trivial compared to the gap between the interbank repo fixing rate and the CNH HIBOR 
(See Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Based on the above assessment, we select the CNY interbank 
repo fixing rate instead of the SHIBOR as the CNY interest rate to be paired with the CNH 
HIBOR in this study. We specifically choose the 7-day (or 1-week) variants of the two 
types of interest rates to conduct our analysis, because the 7-day (or 1-week) maturity is 
one of the two most frequently traded maturities in the CNY and the CNH money markets 
along with the overnight maturity, and it is much less volatile compared to the overnight 
rates. The data of the 7-day CNY interbank repo fixing rate and the 1-week CNH HIBOR 
are obtained from CEIC. In addition to the interest rate data, we obtain the daily data of 
the CNH/USD exchange rate from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The sample period of 
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our data is between June 24, 2013, when the CNH HIBOR was introduced and March 2, 
2017 when the databases were last accessed. It is worth nothing that the holiday schedules 
in the two markets are different. For the dates when only one of the two markets was open 
for business, we fill in the market rate from the previous business day for the market that 
was closed. The interest rate data, the calculated CNH-CNY interest rate spread and the 
exchange rate data are visualized in Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Interest rate data (Source: CEIC, Datastream) 
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Figure 4.5. CNH-CNY interest rate spread (Source: authors) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. CNH exchange rate (Source: Datastream) 
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4.4.1 The structural breaks in the CNH-CNY interest rate spread 
We employ the algorithm specified by Bai and Perron (2003) to estimate the 
optimal number of break points and the break dates in the CNH-CNY interest rate spread 
series based on the model setting described in Section 4.3.1. We set the minimum interval 
between break points as 10% of all the observations, and select the best break point 
number and date combination based on BIC. We identify four break points in the interest 
rate spread series, which took place on May 14, 2014, August 12, 2015, February 29, 2016 
and September 7, 2016, respectively. Based the break dates, we divide our sample into 
five periods and calculate the mean interest rate spread for each period. The mean interest 
rate spreads in the five periods are -248bps, 19bps, 260bps, -34bps and 323bps, 
respectively.  These means are all statistically different from zero at 5% level but their 
differences from zero vary greatly in magnitude. The five periods separated by the break 
dates and the fitted mean for each period are visualized in Figure 4.7.  
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Figure 4.7. Structural breaks and the shifts in the mean CNH-CNY interest rate spread. (Source: 
authors) 
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Periods 2 and 3. According to Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), less liquidity of an asset 
leads to its higher price volatility in a financial market. Based on this property, we 
conjecture that the CNY money market was less liquid than the CNH money market in 
Period 1, but more liquid than the CNH money market in Periods 3 and 5. The enforcement 
of tight capital controls in Period 1, 3, and 5 may have prevented the renminbi from being 
brought from the more liquid market to the less liquid market, subsequently allowing a 
substantial gap between the borrowing costs in the CNY and CNH money markets to 
persist during the these period. This conjecture also explains why the CNY interest rate 
was mostly higher than the CNH interest rate in Period 1 but lower than the CNH interest 
rate in Periods 3 and 5.  
 In order to uncover the policy related factors that led to the structural breaks and 
to infer the motivations behind the shifting capital controls, we further explore the policy 
decisions by the PBOC and its affiliated agencies as well as the major market events 
surrounding the break dates. However, it is often difficult to make a clear-cut assessment 
on the intentions of China’s monetary policymakers, because they have the power to 
intervene the renminbi money markets without resorting to explicit policy changes and 
their actions are not always publicized. For example, since the Hong Kong branches of 
China’s large state-owned banks are among the major participants in the CNH money 
market, the PBOC has the power to tighten up the supply of renminbi in the CNH market 
by privately addressing these banks via “window guidance”20  without making public 
                                                          
20 Windows guidance refers to a persuasion tactic used by the central banks of China and Japan to pressure banks and 
other financial institutions into adhering to policy guidelines. This tactic is known as “moral suasion” or “jawboning” 
in other countries, and is non-mandatory in nature.  
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announcements or policy changes. Therefore, we have no choice but rely heavily on 
informative conjectures to interpret our results.  
 The first structural break that took place in May, 2014 was likely a gradual process 
rather than an abrupt market reaction to a particular policy change. The narrowing CNH-
CNY interest rate spread in April and May, 2014 may have been contributed by both the 
increasing flexibility of the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) 
program and the rapid expansion of the so-called “dim sum” bond market21 in early 2014. 
Launched in 2011, the RQFII program allows qualified financial institutions to invest their 
CNH holdings back to the financial markets in Mainland China, including the interbank 
market and the stock market, making it a major channel for CNH holders to take advantage 
of the higher interest rate in the CNY market and the investment opportunities otherwise 
unavailable to CNH holders. However, the RQFII program is rather restrictive. Institutions 
need to obtain prior approval to take part in the program. Once approved, they are 
subjective to a series of regulatory restrictions, such as the quotas on how much they can 
invest in total and how much they can invest in a specific security. Some of these 
restrictions were relaxed in early 2014. In March and April 2014, the maximum proportion 
of outstanding stocks of a single company that can be invested by foreign investors via the 
RQFII program was raised from 20% to 30% by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), respectively (SSE, 2014; SZSE, 2014). In late May 
2014, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), China’s foreign exchange 
                                                          
21 Dim sum bond refers to the renminbi-denominated bonds issued outside of Mainland China (usually in Hong 
Kong). They are named after dim sum, a popular type of cuisine in Hong Kong.  
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regulator, further relaxed rules on how financial institutions could utilize their quotas to 
invest in open-ended mutual funds (Reuters, 2014). Both of these new rules increased the 
flexibility of the RQFII program, making the repatriation of renminbi funds from offshore 
locations more convenient. Meanwhile, the rapidly expanding dim sum bond market in 
Hong Kong may have encouraged a growing number of Mainland-based enterprises based 
in Mainland China to obtain renminbi financing from CNH holders, thereby allowing them 
to take advantage of the lower interest rate in the offshore market. The rising popularity 
of CNH financing by Mainland entities in early 2014 was evident by the 80% year-over-
year growth of dim sum bond issuances during the period between January 1, 2014 and 
May 5, 2014, and the fact that the Mainland-based financial institutions had already used 
up 85% of annual quota of dim sum bond issuances as of May 5, 2014 (Ministry of 
Commerce, 2014). Although there were still restrictions for Mainland-based entities to 
bring the renminbi funds raised from the offshore market back to the onshore market, the 
financing opportunities in the dim sum bond market nonetheless allowed a proportion of 
the liquidity needs in the onshore market to be shifted offshore. In summary, the relaxation 
of the RQFII program and the expansion of the dim sum market during Period 1 were both 
capable of improving the interactivity between the CNY and the CNH money markets, 
making them the most likely contributors to the structural break in May 2014 and the 
seemingly loosened capital controls in Period 2.  
 The second structural break that took place around August 12, 2015 was 
unambiguously related to the surprising devaluation of the renminbi on August 11, 2015. 
On this date, the PBOC set its official central parity CNY/USD exchange rate down nearly 
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2% to 6.2298 CNY per USD in what it said was a change in methodology to make the 
currency more responsive to market forces (Reuters, 2015a; PBOC, 2016a). Following its 
biggest one-day fall since 1994, the CNY/USD exchange rate was allowed to slide even 
further on August 12, 2015, amounting to a 3.5% drop in two days (Reuters, 2015b). The 
offshore CNH/USD exchange rate fell even more, losing over 4% in two days since 
August 11, 2015, as shown in Figure 4.6. The PBOC did not provide any justification for 
the devaluation beyond the methodology change. But the media speculated that the 
devaluation was intended to boost Chinese exports amid the slowing economic growth in 
the China (Reuters, 2015a and 2015b). The potential explanation for why the sudden 
devaluation led to a structural break in the CNH-CNY interest rate spread and the 
seemingly tightened capital controls in Period 3 is two-fold. First, the capital controls on 
the renminbi may have been inherently more restrictive on the outflows to the offshore 
market than the inflows to the onshore market in order to encourage the repatriation of the 
renminbi while limiting capital outflows. In Period 2, the cross-border flows of the 
renminbi were likely dominated by the inflows from the CNH-market-based investors 
driven by the heated stock market in Mainland China22. In this case, the capital controls 
would appear to be relatively loose and the CNH-CNY interest rate spread would be small. 
However, the direction of the renminbi net cross-border flows may have been quickly 
reversed after the stock market crash in June, 2015 and the renminbi devaluation in August, 
2015. The combined impact of these events would drive foreign investors back to the CNH 
                                                          
22 As a reference, the SSE Composite Index, which gauges the performance of the stocks listed in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, was originally at around 2000 points in early May 2014, but more than doubled in less than a year and 
eventually crossed the 5000-point mark in June 2015.  
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market where they could freely exchange their renminbi for other currencies to avoid 
further loss. In this case, the capital controls would appear to be much stronger and the 
CNH-CNY interest rate spread would be much larger compared to Period 2. Secondly, the 
capital controls may have been further tightened by the PBOC during Period 3 in order to 
stabilize the renminbi exchange rate in the international market after the one-off 
devaluation and deter the renminbi short-sellers. Following the shocking devaluation of 
the renminbi, the panicking CNH depositors in Hong Kong may have rushed to withdraw 
their renminbi funds from the banks and converted the funds into other currencies, putting 
pressure on both the liquidity condition in the CNH interbank money market and the CNH 
exchange rate. Meanwhile, the renminbi short-sellers may have taken advantage of the 
falling CNH exchange rate by borrowing funds from the CNH interbank money market 
and selling them in the FX market, further reducing the liquidity in the CNH interbank 
money market and driving down the CNH exchange rate. To counter these market 
activities, the PBOC may have resorted to new capital control measures to dry up the 
supply of the renminbi liquidity in the CNH money market and push up the CNH interest 
rate, thereby making it much more costly for short-sellers to borrow and more attractive 
for the CNH depositors to hold on to their positions. In this case, we would also see a 
sustaining positive CNH-CNY interest rate spread in Period 3. There were indeed 
indications that the PBOC had implemented new policy measures to tighten the outflows 
of the renminbi during Period 3. In November, 2015, the PBOC reportedly used window 
guidance to instruct the CNH clearing banks to suspend their bond repurchase transactions 
with onshore banks in the CNY money market, making it difficult for the CNH clearing 
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banks to finance in the CNY money market (Reuters, 2015c). On January 12, 2016, the 
overnight CNH HIBOR soared to a record high of 66.82% (See Figure 4.2), which was 
said to be caused by the PBOC deliberately holding back the supply of its currency 
offshore to squeeze the CNH short positions, according to traders in Hong Kong (Reuters, 
2016a). On January 20, 2016, the PBOC published a new regulation stating that the CNH 
deposits that the offshore institutions kept at onshore bank accounts would be subjected 
to the same reserve requirement as the regular onshore bank accounts (PBOC, 2016b), 
reversing a previous exemption on reserve requirement for such deposits and further 
reducing the liquidity in the CNH money market. In Section 4.4.3, we will specifically 
emphasize on how the capital controls on the renminbi have interacted with the fluctuation 
of the CNH exchange rate.  
 The third structural break that took place at the end of February, 2016 was likely 
due to some of the capital control measures implemented in Period 3 being partially 
relaxed at the end of February and at the beginning of March in 2016. On February 24, 
2016, the PBOC announced a new rule intended to expand the participation of qualified 
foreign institutional investors in the CNY interbank bond market, which removed their 
investment quotas in the market and simplified the administrative procedures for them to 
take part in the market (PBOC, 2016b). This new rule meant that more offshore traders 
would gain access to onshore bond investment opportunities as well as onshore repo 
financing opportunities. The offshore traders could utilize the latter as a new source for 
renminbi liquidity. Meanwhile, on March 1, 2016, the PBOC reduced the reserve 
requirement for all banks in China by 0.5%, meaning that 0.5% of all the CNH deposits 
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that were kept at onshore bank accounts could be freed up from the mandatory reserve. 
Both of these two policy adjustments would help easing the supply of renminbi in the 
CNH money market. In comparison, it is difficult to determine the policy factors that may 
have contributed to the fourth structural break that took place around September 7, 2016, 
because there were no capital-control-related policy adjustments announced by China’s 
monetary authority immediately before or after the break date. However, the timing of the 
structural break leads us to speculate its connection to the G20 meeting that took place in 
Hangzhou, China on September 4-5, 2016 and the inclusion of the renminbi as the fifth 
currency in the IMF SDR basket on October 1, 2016. The exchange rate issue was an 
important discussion topic during the G20. The G20 leaders affirmed that they would 
refrain from competitive devaluations of their currencies (G20, 2016). The monetary 
authority in China may have purposely tightened the capital controls following the G20 
meeting to stabilize the renminbi exchange rate in the international market and send a 
gesture of good will to the other major economies. Meanwhile, some traders in the FX 
market suggested that the upcoming SDR inclusion could be another reason why the 
PBOC wanted to stabilize the exchange rate, although there was no confirmation of that 
(Reuters, 2016b). The fact that the CNH exchange rate remained steady at just below 6.7 
CNH per USD during the entire September, 2016, but resumed its decline after October 1, 
2016 seems to support the above speculations (see Figure 4.6). As previously mentioned, 
we will discuss more about how the capital controls on the renminbi had interacted with 
the CNH exchange rate during Period 5 in Section 4.4.3.  
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4.4.2 The Granger causal relationships between the two interest rates 
In Section 4.4.1, we unveil the periodic shifts in the capital controls on the 
renminbi by China’s monetary authority based on the structural break analysis of the 
CNH-CNY interest rate spread. In this subsection, we aim to find out whether or not the 
monetary policy autonomy in China was better maintained during the periods with tight 
capital controls (i.e. Periods 1, 3 and 5) and was compromised during the periods with 
loose capital controls (i.e. Periods 2 and 4) based on the Granger causality tests specified 
in Section 4.3.2.  Before we conduct the Granger causality tests, we first determine which 
one among the three model variants (a), (b) and (c) in Section 4.3.2 is applicable to each 
of the five periods. In the first step, we apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test at 10% 
level on both the levels and the first differences of the two interest rates to determine their 
orders of integration in each of the five periods. The results are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Period 1 
(6/24/2013 - 
5/14/2014) 
Period 2 
(5/15/2014 - 
8/12/2015) 
Period 3 
(8/13/2015 - 
2/29/2016) 
Period 4 
(3/1/2016 - 
9/7/2016) 
Period 5 
(9/8/2016 - 
3/2/2017) 
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡  I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡  I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
 
Table 4.1. Orders of integration 
 
We can see that unit roots only presented in the two interest rates in Period 2 and the CNH 
interest rate in Period 5, and only the interest rates in Period 2 were possible to be 
cointegrated. Therefore, we conduct the Granger causality tests based on the VAR model 
variant (a) for Periods 1, 3 and 4, and based on the VAR model variant (b) for Period 5. 
Meanwihle, we need to further test for the cointegration of the two interest rates in Period 
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2 to determine whether model variant (b) or (c) is applicable for Period 2. In the next step, 
we choose the optimal number of lags for the VAR models in Period 1, 3, 4 and 5 as well 
as the lag order for the Johansen cointegration test in Period 2 based on BIC. The results 
are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Endogenous 
variables 
(𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 , 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡) (𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 , 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡) (𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 , 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡) (𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 , 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡) (Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 , Δ𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡) 
Optimal   
VAR model 
VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
 
Table 4.2. Optimal lag orders for the VAR models in each period 
 
Before performing the Granger tests, we assess the cointegration relationship between the 
two interest rates in Period 2 using the trace test version of the Johansen procedure. The 
test rejects the null hypothesis of zero cointegration relationship at 1% level. Therefore, 
the two interest rates were cointegrated in Period 2, and we use the VAR model variant (c) 
to conduct the Granger causality test for Period 2. Meanwhile, the Johansen procedure 
estimates the long-run relationship between the two interest rate to be 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌,𝑡 −
1.2567 𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻,𝑡, where 𝑑𝑡 is a stationary series. Hence, we set 𝛾 = 1.2567 in the Equations 
(4.6) and (4.7) of the VAR model variant (c). The p-values from the Granger causality 
tests based on the VAR model in each period are shown in Table 4.3.  
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𝑯𝟎 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌 ↛  𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻  0.2272   0.0561* 0.3807 0.1473 0.5128 
𝑟𝐶𝑁𝐻 ↛  𝑟𝐶𝑁𝑌 0.2062 0.1383 0.6550 0.1734 0.7751 
 
Table 4.3. The results of the Granger causality tests in each period. “↛” represents “does not 
Granger cause”. The numbers in the table are p-values based on F-tests. *: significant at 10% level  
 
The results from the Granger causality tests suggest that China’s monetary policy 
autonomy has been well-maintained throughout the five periods regardless of tight or 
loose capital controls, because the CNH interbank interest rate with direct exposure to 
foreign monetary shocks has not been found to Granger cause the CNY interbank interest 
rate in any of the five periods. It appears that the monetary policy autonomy of the PBOC 
was not compromised when capital controls were loosened, which leads us to suspect that 
it was the exchange rate stability being compromised among the three aspects of the 
trilemma. In Section 4.4.3, we will verify if this was indeed the case in reality. Meanwhile, 
the ability for the PBOC to directly intervene the CNH money market, as discussed in 
Section 4.4.1, may have also contributed to the sustaining monetary policy autonomy over 
the five periods, because it allowed the PBOC to respond to foreign monetary shocks 
directly in the international market without interfering its policymaking in the domestic 
market.  
Besides the implications on monetary policy autonomy, the Granger causality 
analysis highlights the uniqueness of Period 2 among the five periods. The signs of the 
segmentation between the CNY and CNH interbank money markets were the least 
pronounced during Period 2. In Section 4.4.1, we have already shown that the benchmark 
interest rates in the two markets during Period 2 were the closest to each other among the 
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five periods, differing by only 19bps in average. In this section, we further show that the 
offshore interest rate was not only cointegrated with the onshore interest rate, but was also 
driven by the onshore interest rate as suggested by the significant Granger causality from 
the CNY interbank interest rate to the CNH interbank interest rate. Based on these findings 
and the fact the most dramatic rise and fall in China’s stock market during the last five 
years took place in Period 2, we suspect there was a strong connection between the 
loosened capital controls and the violent stock market movements during Period 2, but we 
are uncertain about which one was the cause and which one was the outcome. A future 
study can be conducted to explore whether it was the loosened capital controls and the 
subsequent expansion in foreign capital inflows that caused the rapid rise in China’s stock 
market during Period 2, or it was the sustaining inflows of foreign capitals driven by 
China’s heated stock market that allowed China’s monetary authority to maintain 
relatively loose capital capitals during Period 2.   
 
4.4.3 The interaction between the interest rate spread and the CNH exchange rate 
volatility 
As discussed in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, we do not find any indications that the 
shifting capital controls over the five periods have significantly affected the monetary 
policy autonomy in China. In this subsection, we attempt to verify if the shifting capital 
controls were related to the need to stabilize the renminbi exchange rate in the international 
market by exploring the interactions between the CNH-CNY interest rate spread and the 
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volatility of the CNH/USD exchange rate. The calculated volatility measure 𝑣𝑡 is shown 
in Figure 4.8.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. The calculated volatility measure of the CNH/USD exchange rate (Source: authors) 
 
The average daily fluctuation of the CNH/USD exchange rate in the five periods are 
0.076%, 0.098%, 0.196%, 0.147%, and 0.152%, respectively. From Figure 4.8, we can 
obviously see that the fluctuation of the CNH/USD exchange has become substantially 
more volatile since the second structural break that took place around August 12, 2015. 
Meanwhile, we find that the two periods with the highest average volatility are actually 
the two periods with the tightest capital controls instead of the two periods with loose 
capital controls.  
As specified in Section 4.3.3, we use Granger causality tests between the CNH-
CNY interest rate spread and the volatility measure of the CNH/USD exchange rate to 
verify the relationship between the strength of capital controls and the exchange rate 
stability. The Granger causality tests for all the five periods are conducted on the first-
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differences of the interest rate spread and the exchange rate volatility measure in order to 
circumvent the apparent asymmetry in the distribution of our volatility measure. The 
optimal lag orders for the VAR models used for the Granger tests are selected based on 
BIC and listed in Table 4.4. The results of the Granger causality test in each period are 
tabulated in Table 4.5. Additionally, because the signs of the Granger causal relationships 
are also important for the analysis in this subsection, we report the parameter estimates of 
VAR models for the two periods with significant Granger causality test results in Table 
4.6.     
 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
Endogenous 
variables 
(Δ𝑆𝑡 , Δ𝑣𝑡) (Δ𝑆𝑡 , Δ𝑣𝑡) (Δ𝑆𝑡 , Δ𝑣𝑡) (Δ𝑆𝑡 , Δ𝑣𝑡) (Δ𝑆𝑡 , Δ𝑣𝑡) 
Optimal   
VAR model 
VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(2) 
 
Table 4.4. Optimal lag orders for the VAR models in each period 
 
𝑯𝟎 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
𝑆𝑡 ↛  𝑣𝑡  0.4546 0.4633   0.0839* 0.8489 0.0596* 
𝑣𝑡 ↛  𝑆𝑡  0.9580 0.5973 0.3013 0.8576 0.0801* 
 
Table 4.5. The results of the Granger causality tests in each period. “↛” represents “does not 
Granger cause”. The numbers in the table are p-values based on F-tests. *: significant at 10% level  
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Period 3: VAR(1) Period 5: VAR(2) 
Δ𝑆𝑡 Δ𝑣𝑡  Δ𝑆𝑡 Δ𝑣𝑡  
Δ𝑆𝑡−1 
     -0.2856*** 
(0.0900) 
-0.0147* 
(0.0084) 
    -0.0888 
(0.0941) 
    0.0202** 
(0.0087) 
Δ𝑣𝑡−1 
     -0.7955 
(0.7681) 
    -0.2884*** 
(0.0713) 
    2.0256** 
(0.9790) 
     -0.5738*** 
(0.0907) 
Δ𝑆𝑡−2 
  -0.1720* 
(0.0904) 
-0.0026 
(0.0084) 
Δ𝑣𝑡−2 
  0.1709 
(0.9935) 
      -0.3351*** 
(0.0920) 
Constant 
-0.0200 
(0.2353) 
     -0.0090 
(0.0218) 
-0.0106 
(0.1740) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
 
Table 4.6. The parameter estimates for the VAR models in Periods 3 and 5. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level 
 
The main implications from the results above are two-fold. First, the strength of capital 
controls in Periods 2 and 4, the two periods with relatively loose capital controls, is not 
significantly related to the exchange rate stability in these two periods, because we do not 
find any significant Granger causal relationships between the interest rate spread and the 
exchange rate volatility measure. There is no indication that the loosened capital controls 
in Periods 2 and 4 have negatively affected the exchange rate stability during these periods. 
Secondly, there are strong evidences that tightening capital controls may have been used 
by the PBOC as a countermeasure to the destabilizing CNH exchange rate during Periods 
3 and 5, the two periods with the strongest capital controls. But the evidences are 
incomplete. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, if the tightened capital controls were triggered 
by increasing CNH exchange rate volatility, we should see a significant and positive 
Granger causal relationship from the exchange rate volatility measure to the capital control 
measure, i.e. the interest rate spread. According to the Granger test results in Table 4.5 
and the VAR parameter estimates in Table 4.6, such a causal relationship had indeed 
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existed in Period 5, but not in Period 3. Meanwhile, if imposing tighter capital controls 
had been effective in curbing the exchange rate volatility during these period, we should 
see a significant and negative Granger causal relationship from the interest rate spread to 
the exchange rate volatility in these period. We are able to find such a causal relationship 
in Period 3, but not in Period 5. Despite the significant Granger causal relationship from 
the interest rate spread to the exchange rate volatility in Period 5, the partial impact from 
the interest rate spread to the exchange rate was positive instead of negative, as suggested 
by the parameter estimates of the VAR model in Period 5. As such, although the rising 
CNH exchange rate volatility appears to have led to the tighter capital controls in Period 
5, the capital controls may have further increase the CNH exchange rate volatility rather 
than reducing it. In comparison, even though the tightened capital controls in Period 3 
were probably not triggered by the increasing CNH exchange rate in this period, the capital 
controls appears to have helped curb the CNH exchange rate volatility in this period. In 
summary, the financial market openness in China may have been compromised in Period 
3 and 5 in favor of exchange rate stability, but such comprise seems to have limited success 
in supporting the exchange rate stability of the renminbi in the international market.  
 
4.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications  
Combining the empirical results from Section 4.4, we are able to draw a big picture 
on how the three components of the monetary policy trilemma have evolved in China over 
the five periods. In Table 4.7, we summarize our findings in each of the five periods using 
qualitative terms. 
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Components of 
the trilemma 
Period 1 
(6/24/2013 - 
5/14/2014) 
Period 2 
(5/15/2014 - 
8/12/2015) 
Period 3 
(8/13/2015 - 
2/29/2016) 
Period 4 
(3/1/2016 - 
9/7/2016) 
Period 5 
(9/8/2016 - 
3/2/2017) 
The level of 
financial market 
openness 
relatively 
low 
relatively 
high 
relatively low 
relatively 
high 
relatively low 
The status of 
monetary policy 
autonomy 
maintained maintained maintained maintained maintained 
The level of 
exchange rate 
stability 
relatively 
high 
relatively 
high 
relatively low; 
affected by 
capital controls 
relatively 
low 
relatively low; 
affected by 
capital controls 
 
Table 4.7. The attainment of the three components of the monetary policy trilemma. The level of 
financial market openness in each period is assessed based on the strength of capital controls in each 
period 
 
Our findings suggest that the trilemma may have been a binding constraint for the PBOC 
in Periods 1, 3, 4 and 5, because at least one of the three components of the trilemma was 
compromised during each of these four periods. However, the trilemma seems to have 
been temporarily overcome in Period 2. Although strictly speaking, the financial market 
in Mainland China was far from being completely open in Period 2 due to the various 
policy restrictions on cross-border capital movements. Yet, it is still surprising to see that 
China’s policymakers were able to maintain the highest level of financial market openness 
among the five periods in Period 2 without sacrificing much on the monetary policy 
autonomy and the exchange rate stability of the renminbi. 
 Besides revealing the status of the trilemma as a binding policy constraint in China, 
our findings also shed lights on the shifting policy priorities of the PBOC over the last few 
years. It seems that, for the PBOC, the top priority among the three components of the 
trilemma has always been monetary policy autonomy, because this property has been well-
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maintained throughout our sample period regardless of the statuses of financial market 
openness and exchange rate stability, as indicated by our results. The PBOC’s second 
policy priority appears to be alternating between financial market openness and exchange 
rate stability. As discussed earlier, promoting the internationalization of the renminbi has 
been a major policy objective for China’s policymakers in recent years. This objective 
demands the PBOC to increase the openness of China’s financial market while 
maintaining a relatively stable renminbi exchange rate, which could be difficult to achieve 
if monetary policy autonomy is viewed as a prerequisite by China’s policymakers. In 
Period 2, the PBOC may have been helped by the heated stock market in Mainland China, 
so that it could open up more of China’s domestic financial market without worrying much 
about capital outflows and destabilizing renminbi exchange rate. However, since the 
collapse of China’s stock market in June, 2015 and the shocking devaluation of the 
renminbi by the PBOC in August, 2015, the PBOC no longer had the favorable market 
environment needed to advance the renminbi internationalization. Therefore, in the three 
periods following the structural break in August, 2015, the PBOC could only elect to focus 
on one of the two objectives: maintaining exchange rate stability and maintaining financial 
market openness.    
In conclusion, our empirical examination on the interaction between the onshore 
and offshore renminbi interbank interest rates, enabled by the recent introduction of the 
CNH HIBOR, allows us to take a rare glimpse into the thinking of China’s monetary 
policymakers and conjecture how they have handled the well-known monetary policy 
trilemma over the last few years. Our results single out the period between May 15, 2014 
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and August 12, 2015 as a unique period when a relatively high degree of financial market 
openness, well-maintained monetary policy autonomy, and a relatively stable exchange 
rate had coexisted with each other in China. Such a period represents the best case scenario 
that has been achieved by China’s monetary policymakers in recent years when facing the 
challenge of the monetary policy trilemma. A further study can be conducted to identify 
the key market and policy factors that have contributed to the favorable situation in this 
period, and to explore the potential practices that can be adopted by China’s monetary 
policymakers to achieve a favorable policy outcome in the future.   
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY  
 
The empirical findings in Chapters II, III and IV provide partial answers to the 
policy questions raised in Chapter I. The results presented in Chapter II suggest that the 
interbank interest rates in China are still responsive to some of the PBOC’s traditional 
policy instruments such as the deposit benchmark rate and the reserve requirement ratio, 
but the magnitude of their responses to the policy instruments has been significantly 
altered by the structural changes related to the 2007-08 global financial crisis and the 
PBOC’s two major operational changes in 2011 and 2013, respectively. Meanwhile, 
despite the fact that the PBOC has been frequently conducting open market operations in 
the interbank money market, it is still incapable of managing interest rates with open 
market operations alone, because the interbank interest rates are yet to become 
significantly responsive to open market operations. Additionally, there were significant 
discrepancies between the SHIBOR and the interbank repo rate’s responses to policy 
instruments after the structural changes, hinting a potential complication for the PBOC to 
control interest rates via the interbank money market.  
 The results presented in Chapter III suggests that transactions in the interbank 
money market and the exchange-based money market in China had allowed liquidity 
shocks to circumvent the regulatory restrictions and market segmentation that set apart the 
banking sector and China’s volatile stock market during the rollercoaster ride of China’s 
stock market between late-2014 and mid-2015 and the “SHIBOR shock” in mid-2013. 
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This finding can serve as a reminder for China’s policymakers and financial regulators 
regarding the risk of a widespread illiquidity contagion associated the rapid expansion of 
the two money markets. In order to prevent a system-wide liquidity crisis that could 
endanger the solvency of China’s banking sector, the policymakers in China should 
closely monitor the flows of funds through the two money markets in China and create 
new policy measures to alleviate liquidity shocks transmitted through money market 
transactions. 
 The results presented in Chapter IV suggest that, as the PBOC opens up China’s 
domestic financial markets and promotes the internationalization of the renminbi currency 
in recent years, its policymaking has been largely bounded by the monetary policy 
trilemma like the central banks in the other major economies, with the exception of a 15-
month period since May 2014. During this period, a relatively high degree of financial 
market openness, well-maintained monetary policy autonomy, and a relatively stable 
renminbi exchange rate had coexisted in China, as indicated by the onshore and offshore 
renminbi interbank interest rates as well as the renminbi exchange rate. However, this 
period did not last beyond August 2015. As implied by the results in Chapter IV, the PBOC 
may have switched their policy priorities among the three components of the trilemma 
several times in responses to changing market environments. These findings highlight the 
difficulty for the PBOC to achieve certain policy objectives without compromising on the 
others.  
 In summary, this dissertation provides important monetary policy insights related 
to China’s interbank money market that are yet to be uncovered by the previous economics 
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and finance literature. These insights can be valuable for the monetary policymakers in 
China as they move forward in the further liberalization of China’s financial system. 
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